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ABSTRACT 
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is widely 
heralded as the most important international legal instrument for arresting 
the nuclear arms race and impeding further nuclear proliferation.  
Concluded in 1996, the treaty has been signed by 183 countries and ratified 
by 166.  But it has not yet entered into force, because of its unique 
requirement that it not become operational for any state until it has been 
ratified by all forty-four countries designated in its Annex 2.  Thirty-six of 
those Annex 2 states have ratified, but there is little prospect that all of the 
other eight (including the United States, China, India, Pakistan, and North 
Korea) will do so in the foreseeable future.  In the meantime, certain parts 
of the CTBT are being provisionally applied, but other critical aspects are 
in abeyance, and the world’s unrequited demand for a fully effective legal 
prohibition on nuclear weapons testing has jeopardized the global nuclear 
security architecture. 
This Article proposes a novel work-around, to achieve early 
implementation of the CTBT.  Interested states should negotiate a second 
treaty, styled as an Implementing Agreement, through which they could 
promptly effectuate the CTBT among themselves, even if some Annex 2 states 
remained outside the regime.  This approach would free the CTBT from the 
tyranny of a “veto power” currently held by each of the Annex 2 states, and 
would allow the treaty to grow organically, building toward eventual 
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universal acceptance by entering into force now for a sizeable coalition of 
the willing—as other important treaties have traditionally done. 
The legal mechanism for creating such an Implementing Agreement is 
unusual and cumbersome, but it follows an important international law 
precedent.  The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention achieved widespread 
acceptance, but it, too, required substantial modification before its entry into 
force.  There, the participating states successfully fashioned a 1994 
Implementing Agreement to revise important elements.  That document 
provides a useful template for the CTBT to emulate. 
This Article offers a draft of a CTBT Implementing Agreement, 
explaining how its waiver provisions would operate and how it would 
provide interested states a variety of alternative mechanisms for establishing 
a prompt, durable, and legally binding test ban regime. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty1 (CTBT)—the single 
most important arms control instrument restricting both nuclear proliferation 
and the arms race—is in deep trouble.  It was opened for signature on 
September 24, 1996, has been signed by 183 countries and ratified by 166, 
but it has still not entered into force, and there is no prospect that it will 
become legally effective in the foreseeable future. 
Much of the CTBT’s bureaucratic infrastructure is already in place and 
operational, on a provisional basis, but some key elements are held in 
abeyance until the treaty’s formal entry into force, and robust international 
support for even the existing tentative institutions and arrangements may not 
be sustainable indefinitely. 
Moreover, the vulnerability extends beyond this single treaty.  The 
CTBT is widely considered to constitute the most essential linchpin for the 
1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty2 (NPT), the indispensable bulwark 
against further dissemination of nuclear weapons and the associated 
materials, equipment, and technology.  If the CTBT continues to falter, the 
enduring fidelity of the NPT’s 191 parties will be called into question, too. 
The critical legal problem for the CTBT resides in its peculiar—indeed, 
unique and bizarre provisions regulating its entry into force.  Under article 
XIV, the obligation to refrain from explosive testing of nuclear weapons will 
not become mandatory for any state until the treaty has been ratified by all 
forty-four states designated by name in the treaty’s Annex 2.  This roster 
ranges from Algeria to Zaire, and includes persistent outlier states such as 
North Korea, India, and Pakistan, which have exhibited no inclination to 
join.  To date, thirty-six of the Annex 2 states have ratified, but the United 
States, China, and Israel, among others, have not done so—and even if some 
did, the remaining hurdles might render the prospect of entry into force 
illusory. 
Numerous international efforts by states, practitioners, and scholars 
alike, adopting widely varying political and legal strategies, have been 
floated for reconciling the urgent need for operationalizing the CTBT with 
its incommodious article XIV, but none have been availing.  This Article 
therefore proffers another kind of approach. 
The essential novel proposal in this Article is to negotiate and conclude 
a new international instrument—here, styled as an Implementing 
 
 1.  Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Sept. 10, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-28, 35 
I.L.M. 1439 (not yet in force) [hereinafter CTBT]. 
 2.  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 
169 [hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT]. 
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Agreement—that would incorporate by reference most of the text of the 
CTBT but graft on a new provision empowering each state to unilaterally 
waive for itself the rigid entry into force standards of article XIV.  This 
unorthodox process would enable the treaty to become effective promptly 
for individual members of a coalition of the willing, even while some Annex 
2 holdouts remained outside the regime.  Importantly, this Implementing 
Agreement cannot be structured as a formal amendment to the CTBT 
because, in Catch-22 fashion, until the CTBT has entered into force, its 
article VII procedures for adopting and effectuating amendments are not 
functional either.  The conundrum of how to alter the text of a treaty that has 
been painstakingly negotiated, signed, and ratified by so many states, but has 
not yet entered into force, has not been resolved or even routinely addressed 
in international law, but confronting this legal and political puzzle may now 
provide the best hope for the CTBT and the global security benefits it 
promises. 
The device of a semi-freestanding Implementing Agreement is 
admittedly cumbersome—some might liken it to a Rube Goldberg invention, 
in which an extremely elaborate structure with multiple moving parts is 
laboriously crafted in order to perform an ostensibly simple function.3  But 
this approach has been successfully implemented regarding one other 
important, highly-visible and widely-accepted treaty in a very different 
milieu: the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.4  There, the particularly 
problematic provisions of Part XI (regulating the mining of the deep sea bed) 
were altered in major ways twelve years later, after the treaty had already 
been ratified by dozens of countries, but before it had entered into force.  The 
execution of that 1994 precedent cannot prove the desirability of adopting a 
similar strategy for CTBT, but it does at least establish the legal availability 
of the concept, and illustrate how such a work-around might function. 
To make the case for this proposition, this Article is organized as 
follows.  After this Introduction, Part II presents the CTBT’s current 
quagmire.  It highlights both the importance of this treaty (noting its key 
goals and provisions, its historical evolution, and its intimate connection to 
the NPT) and the current political dilemmas impeding its entry into force 
(exploring the text and rationale of article XIV, the saga of the U.S. Senate’s 
negative consideration of the treaty, and the current (limited and perhaps 
fragile) “provisional application” of the CTBT). 
 
 3.  See About Rube, RUBEGOLDBERG.COM, https://www.rubegoldberg.com/about/ (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2017). 
 4.  Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) 
[hereinafter LoSC]. 
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Part III then addresses the proposed solution, in the form of an 
Implementing Agreement styled after that of the Law of the Sea Convention.  
This discussion explains how the waiver provision would operate, and how 
the mechanism would be designed to restore to states their traditional 
freedom of action, enabling a return to “normal” international politics, 
unconstrained by an overly-restrictive treaty text.  It also compares and 
contrasts my proposed bespoke CTBT Implementing Agreement with the 
earlier Law of the Sea Convention model. 
Part IV presents a skeletal draft text of the proposed CTBT 
Implementing Agreement.  It illustrates the key points, highlights the 
prominent options, and includes annotations that identify various drafting 
choices.  The draft text is short, but it includes both a waiver provision 
(enabling states to dispense with the rigidity of Annex 2) and a mechanism 
for expedited entry into force.  The draft is not submitted as a ready-to-sign 
instrument, but it does at least serve to focus the discussion in more concrete 
terms. 
Finally, Part V offers conclusions, the key element of which is the frank 
acknowledgment that the better option, overall, would be for the forty-four 
Annex 2 countries to proceed directly with prompt ratification and 
implementation of the CTBT; going through the “front door” in making the 
treaty is always preferable.  But if, due to strident domestic political 
opposition in the United States and elsewhere, that favored course is 
unavailable, consideration must be given to audacious work-arounds, even 
if they are cumbersome and unwieldy. 
II. THE PROBLEM: CTBT IS CAUGHT IN A QUAGMIRE 
This Part addresses two key background elements.  First, it explains 
what is at stake here—why the world should care enough about the CTBT to 
undertake extreme machinations in support of it.  Second, it describes the 
treaty’s current plight—how it has gotten ensnared by a perverse entry-into-
force provision, and how its current provisional application, for all its value, 
remains an inadequate substitute for a fully operational treaty. 
A. The Importance of CTBT 
The key provision of the CTBT is stated in disarmingly simple language 
in its article I: each party “undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon 
test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent 
any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.”5  It 
 
 5.   CTBT, supra note 1, art. I.1. The reference to “any other nuclear explosion” is meant to 
embrace so-called nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, such as those that might be undertaken for 
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therefore constitutes a permanent, global, legally-binding abolition of 
nuclear weapon tests. 
President Bill Clinton rightly labeled CTBT as “the longest-sought, 
hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control”6—and neither the seeking 
nor the fighting has abated yet.  Although the treaty does not impose any 
limitations on the numbers of nuclear weapons that states may lawfully 
manufacture, possess or deploy—it aims to “ban the bang,” rather than ban 
the bomb—it pursues an even more important long-term objective, by 
restricting qualitative improvements in the devices.  By blocking states from 
conducting developmental or proof testing of new weapons, CTBT seeks to 
impede the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states (based on 
the proposition that countries will be reluctant to invest in complex and 
technologically sophisticated weapons that they cannot fully certify as 
functional).  At the same time, the treaty interdicts the further refinement and 
elaboration of the arsenals of states that have already established their 
nuclear weapons capabilities (again, through the hypothesis that a cautious 
military establishment would hesitate to rely upon any further expansions of 
its technology envelope, in the absence of thorough testing).7 
CTBT advocates concede that this strategy is not iron-clad: a risk-prone 
state might calculate that it could achieve adequate confidence in a new 
nuclear weapon design even without explosive testing.  But, in practice, 
states do insist upon thorough testing of new weapons, including nuclear 
weapons, prior to committing to them—and on the occasions when the 
traditional testing routines have been foreshortened, disappointingly poor 
performance has been common.8 
 
civil engineering operations (e.g., to excavate an underground chamber or to re-route a river), rather than 
for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons.  See Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, COMPREHENSIVE TEST 
BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-
testing/peaceful-nuclear-explosions/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2017). 
 6.  Bill Clinton, President, Remarks by President Bill Clinton to the 52nd Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 22, 1997), 
https://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19970922-20823.html.  
 7.   JAPP RAMAKER, JENNIFER MACKBY, PETER D. MARSHALL & ROBERT GEIL, THE FINAL TEST: 
A HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS 55–57 (2003) 
(stressing the treaty negotiators’ focus on the goals of non-proliferation and arms control); Don Mackay, 
The Testing of Nuclear Weapons Under International Law, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 292 (Gro Nystuen et al. eds., 2014); OLA DAHLMAN, SVEIN MYKKELTVEIT & HEIN 
HAAK, NUCLEAR TEST BAN: CONVERTING POLITICAL VISIONS TO REALITY 14-17 (2009); Daryl G. 
Kimball, The Enduring Nonproliferation Value of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 23 
NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW, nos. 3-4, 397, 400–03 (2016); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, THE 
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY: TECHNICAL ISSUES FOR THE UNITED STATES (2012),  
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/12849/the-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-technical-issues-for-the.  
 8.   J. Michael Gilmore, History of U.S. Weapons Proves Value of Realistic Operational Testing, 
NATIONAL DEFENSE (January 2015); Pierce S. Corden, Historical Context and Steps to Implement the 
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Since July 16, 1945, the United States has conducted some 1032 nuclear 
weapons explosions—about as many as the rest of the world combined.  The 
“box score” for other states shows the following number of events and the 
date of the first test by: Russia (715 tests, starting on August 29, 1949); the 
United Kingdom (45 tests, October 3, 1952); France (210 tests, February 13, 
1960); China (45 tests, October 16, 1964); India (3 tests, May 18, 1974); 
Pakistan (2 tests, May 28, 1998); and North Korea (5 tests, October 9, 2006).9 
1. CTBT and NPT.   
This section addresses the intimate linkage between two critical nuclear 
arms control treaties, in order to demonstrate that the stakes regarding CTBT 
keep increasing.  As the United States and Russia have drawn down their 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons—from a combined inventory of over 60,000 
weapons in 1986 to fewer than 10,000 today—the reliability of the remaining 
force becomes even more pertinent.10  In parallel, as arms controllers 
contemplate the prospect of still more ambitious constraints—leading, some 
visionaries stress, to the objectives of reducing the saliency of nuclear 
weapons in international affairs and ultimately to eliminating nuclear 
weapons entirely—a viable test ban regime becomes even more essential.11 
Indeed, many prominent international voices insist that CTBT is 
already long overdue.  The linkage to the NPT is undeniable—a permanent, 
 
CTBT, in BANNING THE BANG OR THE BOMB? NEGOTIATING THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN REGIME 17, 30 
(Mordechai Melamud et al. eds., 2014); P. TERRENCE HOPMANN, The Verification Debate and Its Effects 
on the Negotiation Process, in BANNING THE BANG OR THE BOMB? NEGOTIATING THE NUCLEAR TEST 
BAN REGIME 32, 32–35 (Mordechai Melamud et al. eds., 2014). As an illustration of the limits of the test 
ban theory of arms control, Israel is widely acknowledged to possess a substantial nuclear weapons 
arsenal, but has never been proven to have conducted an explosive test.  See Arms Control and 
Proliferation Profile: Israel, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ 
israelprofile (last updated May 2017). 
 9.   Nuclear Testing 1945 – Today, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREPARATORY 
COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/nuclear-testing-1945-today/ 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2017); World Overview, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREPARATORY 
COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/world-overview/ (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2017); DAHLMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2–8. Note that there are some inconsistencies in the 
reporting of nuclear testing data, due to uncertainties about the number of separate devices detonated in 
each test and other factors. 
 10.   Nuclear Notebook: Nuclear Arsenals of the World, BULLETIN ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 
http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia (last visited Jan. 27, 2017); Hans M. Kristensen & 
Robert S. Norris, Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016, BULLETIN ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (May 3, 2016), 
http://thebulletin.org/2016/may/russian-nuclear-forces-20169394; Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. 
Norris, United States Nuclear Forces, 2016, BULLETIN ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Mar. 3, 2016), 
http://thebulletin.org/2016/march/united-states-nuclear-forces-20169232. 
 11.   PHILIP TAUBMAN, THE PARTNERSHIP: FIVE COLD WARRIORS AND THEIR QUEST TO BAN THE 
BOMB (2011); GETTING TO ZERO: THE PATH TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (Catherine McArdle Kelleher 
& Judith Reppy eds., 2011); GLOB. ZERO COMM’N, GLOBAL ZERO ACTION PLAN (Feb. 2010), 
http://www.globalzero.org/files/gzap_6.0.pdf. 
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global, complete test ban is routinely cited as the critical quid pro quo in 
return for the promise by 186 of the NPT parties to abjure forever their 
erstwhile right to develop nuclear weapons of their own.12  Article VI of the 
NPT commits parties to pursue in good faith negotiations on “effective 
measures” of arms control,13 and for many impatient partisans, that phrase is 
code for achieving a CTBT.  The NPT regime has revealed deep fissures of 
its own, and until the promise of a test ban is redeemed, the stability of the 
entire post-World War II nuclear security structure lies in peril.14 
2. History of Test Bans 
CTBT has been a hardy perennial on the international agenda of arms 
control since the late 1940s and 1950s,15 but the world has pursued the treaty 
in an erratic stepwise fashion.  One precursor was the 1963 Limited Test Ban 
Treaty16 (LTBT), a multilateral instrument through which states agreed to 
 
 12.   RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 7–8; CORDEN, supra note 7, at 22, 25; THOMAS GRAHAM JR. & 
DAMIEN J. LAVERA, CORNERSTONES OF SECURITY: ARMS CONTROL TREATIES IN THE NUCLEAR ERA 98, 
106 (2003); William Epstein, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Review Conferences, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 855, 862–68 (Richard D. Burns ed., 1993); 
Taous Feroukhi, Two Treaties Closely Intertwined, CTBTO SPECTRUM, Apr. 2015, at 10, 
https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Spectrum/2015/Spectrum_23_p10.pdf.  The NPT 
establishes two classes of parties: the “nuclear weapon states” (NWS) (who had already developed 
nuclear weapons, and would be allowed to retain them) and the “non-nuclear weapon states” (NNWS) 
(who agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons). 
 13.   NPT, supra note 2, art. VI (each party “undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament”). A ban on nuclear weapons testing is the only arms control proposal specifically identified 
in the NPT’s preamble.  Id. at preamble ¶ 10. 
 14.  RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 12; Daniel H. Joyner, The Legal Meaning and Implications of 
Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 397 
(Gro Nystuen, Stuart Casey-Maslen & Annie G. Bersagel eds., 2014); GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 
12, at 1376 (referring to CTBT as “the litmus test” for judging whether the states that possess nuclear 
weapons were fulfilling their obligations under art. VI of the NPT); Epstein, supra note 12; MARY BETH 
D. NIKITIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33548, COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY: 
BACKGROUND AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, 22–26 (2016); Fumio Kishida, Kairat Abdrakhmanov & 
Lassina Zerbo, Joint Appeal, May 2, 2017, available at https://www.ctbto.org/ 
fileadmin/user_upload/statements/2017/02052017_CTBTO_Japan_Kazakhstan_JointAppeal.pdf. 
 15.   RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 1–5; REBECCA JOHNSON, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE 
NEGOTIATION OF THE CTBT AND THE END OF NUCLEAR TESTING, UNIDIR/2009/2 (2009); HOPMANN, 
supra note 8, at 32, 38–46; GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 12, at 1375; Benjamin S. Loeb, Test Ban 
Proposals and Agreements: The 1950s to the Present, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND 
DISARMAMENT 827 (Richard D. Burns ed., 1993); 1945-54: Early Efforts to Restrain Nuclear Testing, 
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/history-
1945-1993/1945-54-early-efforts-to-restrain-nuclear-testing/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2017); NIKITIN, supra 
note 14, at 1–2; Jenifer Mackby, Still Seeking, Still Fighting, 23 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW, nos. 3-4, 
261 (2016) [hereinafter Mackby Still Seeking] 
 16.   Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 
Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313 [hereinafter Limited Test Ban Treaty or LTBT]. This treaty is also 
sometimes cited as the Partial Test Ban Treaty. 
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prohibit nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer 
space, confining them to deep underground chambers.17  The LTBT 
staunched the production of airborne radioactivity from explosions, serving 
as a public health and environmental protection measure as well as a partial 
barrier to the development of new weapons.18  Two bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
increments followed: the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty19 and the 1976 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty20  (each supplemented by extensive 
protocols in 1990 to enhance verification of compliance).21 These confined 
the size of the permitted underground nuclear events, contributing to limit 
the superpowers’ process of inventing and perfecting new weapons.22  In 
addition, a series of regional treaties has created “nuclear weapon free zones” 
covering much of the world; these include prohibitions on the conduct of 
nuclear weapon tests in the defined zones.23 
Another, possibly even more important, kind of inhibition has arisen 
from the exchange of non-legally-binding national declarations of 
“moratoria” against the conduct of nuclear tests.  These unilateral but parallel 
exercises of restraint have emerged in two separate eras.  First, between 1958 
and 1961, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom 
reciprocally refrained from conducting explosive tests, relying on remote 
monitoring of each other’s activities, during the pendency of negotiations on 
what became the LTBT.24 
The second, current moratorium period has proven to be far more 
widespread and long-lasting, even though it, too, is not legally compulsory.  
Russia, for example, has voluntarily not conducted a nuclear explosion since 
October 24, 1990; the United States has refrained since September 23, 1992.  
Other nuclear powers have eschewed testing, too: the United Kingdom (since 
 
 17.   Id. at art. I.  See RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 6–7; HOPMANN, supra note 8, at 41–46; GRAHAM 
& LAVERA, supra note 12, at 29–31; Loeb, supra note 15, at 830–35; JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 13–16. 
 18.   RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 7; Mackay, supra note 7, at 294–96; JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 
16; THE MAKING OF THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY, 1959-1963 (William Burr & Hector L. Montford 
eds., 2003), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB94/. 
 19.   Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, U.S.-U.S.S.R., July 3, 1974, 
1714 U.N.T.S. 217. 
 20.   Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 28, 
1976, 1714 U.N.T.S. 432. 
 21.   See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 12, at 374, 376, 439. 
 22.   RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 9, 11; GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 12, at 372, 434; Loeb, 
supra note 15, at 836–37, 839–41; JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 20.  Under these treaties, underground 
nuclear explosions are confined to less than 150 kilotons yield. 
 23.  See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 12, at 41–97. 
 24.   Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, 
U.S. DEP’T STATE, BUREAU ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE, 
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/199116.htm; RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 3–6; Loeb, supra note 15, at 
829–31. 
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November 26, 1991), France (since January 27, 1996), China (since July 29, 
1996), India (since May 13, 1998), and Pakistan (since May 30, 1998).25  
Only North Korea has tested during the 21st century, events that prompted 
robust condemnation and sanctions from the U.N. Security Council.26 
As welcome as this pattern of national self-restraint is, and as valuable 
as the prior string of treaties may be, they do not accrete into an operational 
CTBT.27  Until that treaty comes into force, the proscription against the 
development and dissemination of nuclear weapons is still inchoate and 
incomplete.28  And as discussed in the next section, the prospects for 
reaching that legal watershed are remote, at best. 
B. The Stagnation of CTBT 
By many measures, the CTBT has achieved stunning success.  The 
dogged pursuit of universality has brought 183 signatories into the fold—
with a few conspicuous exceptions noted below, the thirteen non-signatories 
are largely peripheral to international affairs and preoccupied with their own 
internal disruptions.  Some 166 states have already deposited instruments of 
ratification, with strong representation from every continent, bloc, and 
interest group, and including three states that have long possessed nuclear 
weapons (France, Russia, and the UK).  Admittedly, much of the momentum 
toward affiliation has abated; the most recent signature (Niue) came on April 
9, 2012, and only two states (Swaziland and Myanmar) have ratified within 
 
 25.   Nuclear Testing 1945 – Today, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N, 
https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/nuclear-testing-1945-today/; NIKITIN, 
supra note 14, at 1–14; JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 40–46. 
 26.  See S.C. Res. 2270 (Mar. 2, 2016) (condemning North Korea’s nuclear weapons test and 
imposing stringent economic sanctions); S.C. Res. 2094 (Mar. 7, 2013); S.C. Res. 1874 (June 12, 2009); 
Leon V. Sigal, Getting What We Need with North Korea, 46 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 8, Apr. 2016; 
NIKITIN, supra note 14, at 15–21. 
 27.  See also Pakistan Offers Nuclear Non-Testing Agreement to India, INDIAN EXPRESS (Aug. 16, 
2016), http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pakistan-offers-nuclear-non-testing-
agreement-to-india-2979122/ (describing proposal by Pakistan to India to conclude a legally-binding 
bilateral test ban treaty); Beyza Unal, Patricia Lewis, and Susan Aghlani, The Humanitarian Impacts of 
Nuclear Testing: Regional Responses and Mitigation Measures, Chatham House, May 8, 2017, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/humanitarian-impacts-nuclear-testing-regional-responses-
and-mitigation-measures (emphasizing the adverse public health and environmental effects of nuclear 
weapons testing, and calling for entry into force of the CTBT). 
 28.  Note that under the NPT, most parties are already indirectly prohibited from testing nuclear 
weapons, even prior to entry into force of the CTBT, because they have agreed not to receive, manufacture 
or acquire nuclear weapons; possession or control of a nuclear weapon would be a precursor to conducting 
a test explosion. NPT, supra note 2, art. II. 
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the past two years—but much of that slowdown may be attributable to the 
simple fact that there are not many strays left to absorb.29 
But upon closer inspection, the portrait is not so salutary.  As explored 
infra, the most relevant membership criterion is the participation by the 
forty-four states identified in Annex 2 of the treaty; their affiliation is 
necessary for the CTBT to enter into force for anyone.  Among that select 
clique, forty-one have signed (not including India, North Korea, and 
Pakistan) and thirty-six have ratified (excluding China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, 
and the United States, in addition to the aforementioned three states).  No 
Annex 2 state has signed the treaty since Bangladesh on October 24, 1996, 
and none has ratified since Indonesia on February 6, 2012.30 
1. Entry Into Force Provisions 
The spare language of article XIV.1 has created this profound anomaly: 
“This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the 
instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but 
in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature.”31  Annex 2 
then contains the names of the forty-four states that were active members of 
the Conference on Disarmament (a United Nations affiliate, charged with 
primary responsibility for negotiating instruments such as the CTBT32) and 
that were contemporaneously identified by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency33 (IAEA) as possessing nuclear power reactors or nuclear research 
reactors.34  That august group does include most of the countries that are, in 
some sense, nuclear-capable, and whose participation in a test ban regime 
would be especially desirable.  But to condition the entry into force of the 
treaty for anyone upon the unanimous assent by such a large and diverse 
group is both largely unprecedented and highly unfortunate.35 
 
 29.   Status of Signature and Ratification, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. 
COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/ (last visited Jan. 27, 
2017).  
 30.   Id.  
 31.   CTBT, supra note 1, art. XIV.1. 
 32.   See An Introduction to the Conference, THE U.N. OFFICE AT GENEVA, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?Ope
nDocument (presenting the history, operations and membership of the Conference on Disarmament). 
 33.   See History, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iaea.org/ (last visited Jan. 23, 
2017) (describing the operations of IAEA). 
 34.  CTBT, supra note 1, at Annex 2 to the Treaty. 
 35.  Id. (providing the: “List of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 
1996 which formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in 
Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s April 1996 edition of ‘Nuclear Power Reactors in 
the World,’ and of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally 
participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table 1 of the 
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The United States was the first country to sign the CTBT,36 but as 
elaborated infra, it has not yet ratified.  Some observers have speculated that 
U.S. ratification, whenever it occurs, could prompt a modest cascade among 
other Annex 2 holdouts, with China37 and perhaps Israel38 joining shortly 
thereafter.  But even if that contingency transpired, it would require 
additional regional political seismic shifts to secure ratification by India and 
Pakistan, and the political permutations would have to play out in even more 
unexpected ways to imagine North Korea and Iran associating themselves 
with the CTBT.39  So while it is possible that the treaty will inch forward 
with additional signatures and ratifications in the years to come, it is hard to 
foresee entry into force, even if the United States were at some point in the 
future to ratify with a gusto that might sweep some others along, too. 
Why was the treaty crafted in this peculiar way—why did the 
negotiators deliberately insert what might be called a “non-entry-into-force” 
 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s December 1995 edition of ‘Nuclear Research Reactors in the 
World’: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, 
Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of 
America, Viet Nam, Zaire.”) 
 36.  See 1996: CTBT: A Long-Sought Success, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. 
COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/1993-1996-treaty-negotiations/1996-ctbt-a-long-sought-
success/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2017). 
 37.   Kevin Rudd, A U.S.-China Roadmap for CTBT Ratification, CTBTO SPECTRUM, Apr. 2015, 
at 9; Rakesh Sood, Why the CTBT Remains an Elusive Goal, OBSERVER RES. FOUND., Oct. 2016, at 1, 
http://cf.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ORF_Issue_Brief_161_on_CTBT.pdf. 
 38.   Israel Backs Nuclear Test Ban Treaty – With No Timeframe for Ratification, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE (June 20, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/israel-backs-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-with-no-timeframe-
for-ratification/a-19343675 (reporting Israeli government support for the CTBT); Bernard Sitt, What 
Does the Future Hold for the CTBT?, 89 CESIM 1 (2014), http://www.cesim.fr/documents/onp/eng/89.pdf 
(anticipating that U.S. ratification of the CTBT would create a “virtuous circle” with other states soon 
joining, too); NIKITIN, supra note 14, at 13–14 (assessing reported conditions for Israeli ratification of 
CTBT); Massimiliano Moretti, The Past, Present, and Future of the CTBT(O): A Conversation with the 
Executive Secretary, 23 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW, nos. 3-4, 253, 255–56 (speculating about a 
“domino effect” of countries’ ratifications, and reporting that Israel’s ratification of the CTBT is a “matter 
of ‘when’ not ‘if’”). 
 39.   Sood, supra note 37, at 5–6 (discussing the difficulty of obtaining ratification by India and 
Pakistan); Tariq Rauf, ‘Unfinished Business’ on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), SIPRI (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-
backgrounder/2016/unfinished-business-twentieth-anniversary-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty 
(reporting that the prospects for CTBT entry into force “remain dim”); Jenifer Mackby, Nonproliferation 
Verification and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 697, 727–31 (2011) (discussing 
treaty prospects in the states that have not yet ratified) [hereinafter, Mackby Nonproliferation 
Verification]; NIKITIN, supra note 14, at 10–14; Kimball, supra note 7, at 404 (reporting a senior North 
Korean official commenting favorably about the “great contribution to world peace and stability” that 
CTBT’s entry into force would provide). 
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provision into article XIV?  Jaap Ramaker, who served as chair of the CTBT 
negotiations in 1996, has emphasized that the deliberations over the treaty’s 
entry into force provisions became “the hottest item”40 for the delegations, 
other than the controversy over the scope of the treaty’s basic obligations, 
and that article XIV turned out to be “the most contentious issue”41 in the 
negotiations’ end game. 
The ambassadors needed to balance several competing interests in this 
context.42  First, one widely-accepted principle was to require that when the 
treaty eventually entered into force, it would affect a large number of 
countries simultaneously, so each state could be confident that it would not 
be asymmetrically constrained.  That is, the CTBT should not finally deprive 
any state of its right to exercise a conceivably militarily-and politically-
valuable nuclear weapons option unless its potential adversaries would be 
identically obligated.  In a complex and heterogeneous world, where one 
state’s nuclear arsenal could plausibly threaten many neighbors (and non-
neighbors), the global threat matrix seemed tightly interwoven.43 
A second, related criterion was to ensure that the treaty would embrace 
certain key states right from the start—and opinions differed as to which 
specific states were sufficiently “key” that their immediate participation 
should be required.  Many participants concluded that the roster would have 
to include at least the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council 
(China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—who 
are, not just coincidentally, also the states that were  recognized under the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as possessing nuclear weapons).  Many 
also insisted upon including the three prominent additional states that were 
sometimes then designated as “nuclear threshold” states, India, Pakistan, and 
 
 40.   RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 235. 
 41.   Id. at 253; see also JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 126–37.  
 42.   RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 235–56; JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 109–43; Mackby Still 
Seeking, supra note 15, at 272–75. 
 43.   RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 235; JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 112–15. 
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Israel.44  (Now, all three, plus North Korea, have clearly crossed that 
threshold and are acknowledged to possess nuclear weapons.45) 
At the same time, participants were also keenly aware of the danger of 
levying too heavy a burden upon entry into force, because doing so would 
confer upon each designated state a “veto” over the treaty’s effectiveness.46  
No one wanted to insert that type of “poison pill” into article XIV.  
Additionally, some countries (notably India) wanted to avoid being labeled 
by name as pre-requisites for the entry into force, in order to eliminate any 
implication that they somehow constituted “problem states” for the CTBT.47  
And some wanted to avoid any direct recognition of the NPT’s nuclear 
weapons possessing states and the threshold states, as if they were being 
“rewarded” with a special status under the treaty for having previously 
acquired nuclear arms.48 
Various states therefore proffered a wide array of competing proposals 
for the treaty’s entry into force, some of which embodied the virtue of 
relative simplicity, while others contained many moving parts.  Most 
conspicuously, several states dug in their heels on this point, offering little 
negotiating flexibility over a protracted period, with no consensus 
emerging.49 
 
 44.   RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 235; 1994-96: Entry into Force Formula, COMPREHENSIVE TEST 
BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/1993-1996-treaty-
negotiations/1994-96-entry-into-force-formula/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2017); DAHLMAN ET AL., supra note 
7, at 77 (noting that at the time when the CTBT negotiators were considering various formulas for entry 
into force, they became aware that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a major disarmament 
agreement abolishing that entire category of weapons, was coming close to fulfilling its relatively simple 
requirement for entry into force. The CWC specified that effectuation would occur when sixty-five states 
ratified, without any special qualifications or designations of individual required participants. At that 
point, it appeared that the CWC might achieve sixty-five ratifications and enter into force without 
membership by the United States or Russia, by far the leading chemical weapons-possessing states.  
Although that scenario did not come to pass—both the United States and Russia soon ratified the CWC—
the CTBT negotiators were motivated to avoid setting up that sort of possibility); Mackby Still Seeking, 
supra note 15, at 273. 
 45.   See Nuclear Testing supra note 9 (reporting the “box score” of nuclear testing). 
 46.   RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 237–38, 247. 
 47.   RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 237, 252; Ulrika Moller, Explaining Why India Opted Out, in 
BANNING THE BANG OR THE BOMB? NEGOTIATING THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN REGIME 190, 214–15 
(Mordechai Melamud et al. eds., 2014); THOMAS GRAHAM JR., DISARMAMENT SKETCHES: THREE 
DECADES OF ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 253–54 (2002) [hereinafter GRAHAM, 
Sketches]; JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 118–21. 
 48.  RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 242. 
 49.  RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 237–39, 248 (observing that “for every suggestion or proposal there 
was at least one delegation opposed”); JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 117–40; Mackby Still Seeking, supra 
note 15,  at 274; 1994-96: Entry into Force Formula,  COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. 
COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/1993-1996-treaty-negotiations/1994-96-entry-into-force-
formula/. 
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Ultimately, a core group of states—including China, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, Pakistan, and Egypt—prevailed with the not-so-Solomonic 
insistence that article XIV must embrace all the states that might be of some 
nuclear concern.  They pursued different proffered formulas listing from 
twenty-nine to ninety-three countries, eventually settling on the forty-four 
designees now included in Annex 2.50  The United States resisted this 
Achilles heel for entry into force, but ultimately conceded the point, hoping 
that, eventually, the hydraulic pressure of international politics would drive 
all the necessary states to join the treaty.51  If the choice boiled down to a 
CTBT that might take a long time to effectuate versus the possibility that 
resisting the hardliners on this issue might result in no CTBT at all, the 
United States and others backed down.52 
One intermediate position that attracted substantial interest throughout 
the negotiations would have accepted the stringent standard for entry into 
force, but additionally allowed each individual state to “waive” that rigidity 
for itself, if it so desired, thereby enabling the CTBT to become operational 
more quickly for the most willing parties.53  The leading precedent for that 
more liberal approach in other arms control treaties, and the possibility of its 
continuing relevance for the CTBT, are discussed infra.54 
2. U.S. Ratification Efforts 
Just as this treaty has been ardently supported by its champions, it has 
evoked equally entrenched opposition.  In the United States, in particular, 
 
 50.   RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 247–48; Rebecca Johnson, The Role of Civil Society in Negotiating 
the CTBT, in BANNING THE BANG OR THE BOMB? NEGOTIATING THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN REGIME 96, 
115–16 (Mordechai Melamud et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter Johnson, Role in Society]; JOHNSON, supra 
note 15, at 113–41; Mackby, Still Seeking, supra note 15, at 273 (noting that the United States had 
proposed that CTBT entry into force should be achieved if only 95 percent, rather than all, of the countries 
on a designated list were to ratify).  It is not customary to identify countries directly by name in crafting 
treaty restrictions of this sort, so the diplomatic artifice is to rely instead upon a list or roster of relevant 
states that had been originally created for some other purpose and incorporate it by reference. 
 51.   RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 254. 
 52.  Id. at 256 (concluding that: “The negotiations could easily have broken down on this issue 
alone.”); JOHNSON, Role in Society, supra note 50 at 116 (criticizing poor negotiating tactics by 
participants, which created “an unwieldy, unworkable Article XIV”); GRAHAM, Sketches, supra note 47, 
at 254–55; JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 122–35; Sabine Bauer and Cormac O’Reilly, The Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO): Current and Future Role in the Verification Regime of 
the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law 131, 136 (Jonathan L. 
Black-Branch and Dieter Fleck eds., vol. II, 2016) (noting that commentators have criticized art. XIV as 
“the worst entry-into-force provision ever negotiated,” but most negotiators did not imagine a delay of 
more than a few years before entry into force). 
 53.   RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 238, 241–43, 249–52; JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 114–16; Anguel 
Anastassov, Can the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Be Implemented Before Entry into Force? 
55 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 73, 82 (2008).  
 54.  See infra, III.E. 
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CTBT has always provoked persistent domestic political turmoil.55  Most 
overtly, partisan resisters in the Senate rejected a resolution of ratification 
for CTBT by a 51-48 vote on October 13, 1999.56  A decade of political 
gridlock and stagnation followed, with no progress toward U.S ratification.  
Thereafter, the Obama Administration pledged high priority support for a 
renewed effort to obtain the two-thirds endorsement necessary to ratify the 
agreement, but senior spokespersons subsequently acknowledged that the 
political calculations remained decidedly adverse, and that a long-term 
strategy of educating and informing the American public and the members 
of Congress would have to pre-date any renewed legislative consideration.57  
The political course of CTBT through the next phase of U.S. politics is 
anybody’s guess, but to date, neither the Trump Administration nor the 
Republican-controlled Senate has signaled any interest in proceeding toward 
effectuating the treaty.58 
 
 55.  See Edward Ifft, The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and US Security, 23 
NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW, nos. 3-4, 385–89 (2016). 
 56.  Chris McIntosh, Framing the CTBT Debate over the U.S. Ratification of the Treaty, in 
BANNING THE BANG OR THE BOMB? NEGOTIATING THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN REGIME 146 (Mordechai 
Melamud et al. eds., 2014); 1992-2002: The United States and the CTBT, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN 
TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N,  https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-after-1996/1999-2002-
the-united-states-and-the-ctbt/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2017); see David S. Jonas, The Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Current Legal Status in the United States and the Implications of a Nuclear 
Test Explosion, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1007, 1019–26 (Sept. 26, 2007). 
 57.  NIKITIN, supra note 14, at 4–7 (reporting statements by the President, Vice President, and other 
senior Obama administration officials favoring CTBT but recognizing the necessity of additional 
preparations before another Senate vote); Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at CTBT 
Article XIV Conference, New York, NY (Sept. 24, 2009), 
https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2009/240909_Morning_Session/240909_US.pdf; 
Rose Gottemoeller, Acting U.S. Under Sec’y of State, Statement to the Article XIV Conference, United 
Nations (Sept. 27, 2013), https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2013/ 
Statements/united_states.pdf; U.S. Statement to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization’s PrepCom 20th Anniversary Ministerial Meeting (June 13, 2016), 
http://www.state.gov/t/us/2016/258408.htm, archived at https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20170120160252/https://www.state.gov/t/us/2016/258408.htm; Rose Gottemoeller, Rebuilding 
American Support for the CTBT, 23 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW, nos. 3-4, 362 (2016). 
 58.  See Masakatsu Ota, Nuclear Test Ban Facing New Challenge on Trump’s Watch, KYODO 
NEWS, Mar. 9, 2017 (noting that the Republican Party has traditionally been hostile to the CTBT); James 
Glanz, Rick Perry, as Energy Secretary, May Be Pressed to Resume Nuclear Tests, NEW YORK TIMES, 
Dec. 27, 2016 (reporting political pressure to return to testing); but see Michael Krepon, Trump and the 
Bomb: U.S. Nuclear Policy Under the Next Administration, FOREIGN AFF., Nov. 20, 2016, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-11-20/trump-and-bomb, (arguing that: “Trump could 
surprise everyone by calling on the Senate to proceed with the hearings and then consent for the CTBT’s 
ratification.”).  
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3. Verification Debates  
One of the most basic questions confronting any arms control 
agreement concerns verification of compliance: how can each party be 
confident that its treaty partners (and potential adversaries) are faithfully 
complying with their agreed restraints?  Especially for a treaty as significant 
as CTBT, adequate certainty about other states’ fidelity is essential, and the 
bulk of the accord’s nearly 100 pages of text is devoted, in one way or 
another, to that concern.59 
Three aspects of the CTBT verification apparatus are worth 
highlighting here.  First, the treaty establishes an International Monitoring 
System (IMS) of unprecedented scope and strength.  Under the treaty, a 
network of 321 monitoring stations and sixteen laboratories is to be 
constructed or adapted in eighty-nine countries worldwide.  These employ 
four distinct technologies, with state-of-the-art sensors for seismological, 
radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound monitoring.   The sensors are 
linked through a dedicated Global Communications Infrastructure, based on 
a constellation of six satellites, to provide near-real-time reporting of the 
yield to the International Data Center in Vienna, Austria.  The IMS is now 
more than ninety percent operational, providing voluminous, high-quality, 
and authenticated data to CTBT participating states, and enabling much 
greater visibility of any attempted covert nuclear testing.60 
The second key component of the CTBT verification scheme consists 
of mechanisms for on-site inspection.  In the event of a suspicious event, a 
challenging party could employ the treaty’s detailed and mandatory 
procedures to trigger a visit by outside observers who would be authorized 
 
 59.  RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 91–176 (discussing the protracted negotiation over the verification 
provisions of the CTBT); see Paul Meerts & Mordechai Melamud, Putting OSI on the Table, in BANNING 
THE BANG OR THE BOMB? NEGOTIATING THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN REGIME 326 (Mordechai Melamud et 
al. eds., 2014); DAHLMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 25–58. 
 60.  CTBT, supra note 1, art. IV and Protocol, Part 1; Verification Regime, COMPREHENSIVE TEST 
BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N https://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2017) 
(describing the IMS network, the constellation of satellite communications links, and the International 
Data Center); Lassina Zerbo, The Challenges to Ratifying the CTBT – Can the No-Test Norm Be 
Maintained Indefinitely?, EUR. LEADERSHIP NETWORK (Sept. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Zerbo], 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170314020141/http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-
challenges-to-ratifying-the-ctbt—can-the-no-test-norm-be-maintained-indefinitely_777.html  
(estimating the cost of the CTBTO verification network at around $1 billion); see COMPREHENSIVE TEST 
BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2015, 1–27; Stephen Herzog, The Nuclear Test 
Ban: Technical Opportunities for the New Administration, 47 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, no. 1, 26,  (2017) 
(suggesting improvements in the CTBT monitoring system). 
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to probe the suspect location with modern tools and techniques to gather 
telltale evidence of any clandestine nuclear event.61 
Finally, the treaty incorporates a series of algorithms for consultation, 
exchanges of information, and dispute resolution, in the event of any 
question about treaty compliance.62  Those routines would operate through a 
new dedicated international organization, the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty Organization (CTBTO), in which all treaty parties would become 
members.63 
4. Provisional Application of the CTBT 
This treaty structure, like several others, provides for provisional 
operation of some of the key features of the treaty architecture, prior to its 
formal entry into force.  The concept is that essential aspects of the 
verification apparatus, such as the network of IMS sensors, should be 
established during the interval between signature and ratification, so they can 
be fully in service on Day One of the treaty regime.64 
In this instance, the states that had been early in signing the CTBT also 
adopted a “Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission” and 
specified which elements of the treaty structure would become operational 
immediately.65  The Preparatory Commission is to function as a temporary 
 
 61.  CTBT, supra note 1, art. IV.D and Protocol, Part II; The Final Verification Measure, 
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/verification-
regime/on-site-inspection/the-final-verification-measure/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2017) (describing 
preparations for on-site inspection); COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N, ANNUAL 
REPORT 2015, 33–42. 
 62.  CTBT, supra note 1, arts. V, VI. 
 63.  CTBT, supra note 1, art. II; The Organization, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. 
COMM’N (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.ctbto.org/the-organization/.  
 64.  CTBT, supra note 1, art. IV.1 (specifying that: “At entry into force of this Treaty, the 
verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of this Treaty.”); 
Establishment, Purpose, and Activities, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N, 
https://www.ctbto.org/the-organization/ctbto-preparatory-commission/establishment-purpose-and-
activities/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2017)  ) (describing the creation and operation of the provisional structures 
intended to pave the way for full operation of the treaty as soon as it enters into force); see DAHLMAN ET 
AL., supra note 7, at 99–111; Anastassov, supra note 53, at 89–95; Masahiko Asada, CTBT: Legal 
Questions Arising from Its Non-Entry-Into-Force, 7 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 85, 104–13 (2002); see 
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS L. OF THE UNITED STATES § 312 cmt. h 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987) (discussing the concept and operation of provisional application) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT]; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 25, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 
I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT] (discussing provisional application of a treaty or part of a treaty); Andrew 
Michie, The Provisional Application of Arms Control Treaties, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 345, 356–
74 (2005) (discussing examples of provisional application of arms control treaties); ANTHONY AUST, 
MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 172–74 (2d ed. 2007). 
 65.   Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Signatories, Assembly Res.  CTBT/MSS/RES/1 
(Nov. 27, 1996), https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/CTBT-MSS-RES-1-e_01.pdf 
(establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
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surrogate for the eventual CTBTO and to pave the way for that formal 
successor body.66  The signatories indicated that the IMS should be 
established and networked, and a variety of guidance manuals for the four 
monitoring technologies prepared.  The Preparatory Commission was also 
assigned an array of tasks regarding the eventual conduct of on-site 
inspections, such as the development of procedures and formats for 
designating inspectors and initiating their functions—but the ability to 
conduct any on-site inspections was not made part of the provisional 
application.  Similarly, the CTBT’s consultation and dispute resolution 
articles are not fully activated until the treaty enters into force.67 
Provisional implementation of the monitoring apparatus has been 
highly successful.  To date, 288 of the contemplated 337 stations and 
laboratories have been constructed and certified, and most are steadily 
providing their input to the International Data Center.  A further sixteen 
stations have been installed but not yet certified, sixteen are under 
construction, and seventeen are still in the planning stage.68  These 
installations have functioned admirably, such as to detect, locate and identify 
the North Korean nuclear tests, ensuring a degree of transparency and 
documentation to those events, and validating the concept of CTBT 
verification.69  In addition, the IMS has generated other major unanticipated 
 
Organization).  Unlike for some other treaties, the CTBT negotiators deliberately did not explicitly adopt 
the term “provisional application” in the CTBT documents.  Some observers therefore refer to the current 
status as “implied” provisional application, or distinguish between provisional application and provisional 
entry into force.  For present purposes, the concepts and structures are operationally similar.  See Michie, 
supra note 64, at 355, 367–73; Anastassov, supra note 53, at 92; Glossary, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/page1_en.xml (providing sections 
on Provisional Application and Provisional Entry into Force of Treaties); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., LAW OF THE SEA TREATY: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO PROVISIONAL 
APPLICATION (Comm. Print 1974); Robert E. Dalton, Provisional Application of Treaties, in THE 
OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 220–247 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012); Gabriella Venturini, The CTBTO 
PrepCom at Twenty: Beyond the CTBT?, 23 NONPROLIFERATION REV., nos. 3-4, 345, 350 (2016); Bauer 
and O’Reilly, supra note 52, at 139-43. 
 66. CTBT Assembly Res. CTBT/MSS/RES/1, 2 (Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory 
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization). 
 67.  See id. at 8–13 (providing an Indicative List of Verification Tasks of the Preparatory 
Commission, Appendix to Text on the Establishment of the PrepCom); DAHLMAN ET AL., supra note 7, 
at 138–42.  The CTBTO has undertaken important preparations for the eventual conduct of on-site 
inspections, such as conducting field exercises and simulations. See NIKITIN, supra note 14, at 27–28; 
On-Site Inspections, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/ 
specials/integrated-field-exercise-2014/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2017); OLA DAHLMAN ET AL., DETECT AND 
DETER: CAN COUNTRIES VERIFY THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN? 129–57 (2011).  
 68.  International Monitoring System Status, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. 
COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).  
 69.  9 September 2016 North Korea Announced Nuclear Test, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY 
ORG. PREP. COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-after-1996/2016-sept-dprk-
announced-nuclear-test/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2017); see generally NIKITIN, supra note 14, at 15–21; 
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spinoff benefits, such as providing crucial timely warning of seismic events 
that could generate life-jeopardizing Pacific Rim tsunamis or tracking the 
plume of radioactive gases from the Fukushima reactor disaster.70 
The Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat 
have become nearly full-fledged international institutions, hosting a wide 
array of high-level conferences, concluding legally-binding international 
agreements, building an enduring infrastructure, and operating a budget of 
$128,120,000 in 2016.71 
At the same time, provisional implementation remains an inadequate 
substitute for full functionality of the CTBT.  For one thing, some countries 
(China, Egypt, India, Iran, and Pakistan, for example) have been slow to 
establish the planned IMS facilities on their territories, or unwilling to 
contribute data from them until the treaty is in force.72  Additionally, as noted 
above, some powerful implementation aspects of the treaty—the ability to 
demand an on-site inspection, or to make full use of the institutional dispute 
resolution alternatives—are in abeyance.73  And a lingering uncertainty may 
persist about whether states that have signed the treaty are obliged, by 
customary international law or by article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the 
 
Simeon Dukic & Matteo Zerini, The CTBT International Monitoring System: A Tale of Two Tests, TR. & 
VERIFY (Verification Research, Training and Info. Ctr., London, U.K.), Autumn 2016, at 9. 
 70.  See Spin-Offs for Disaster Warning and Science, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. 
PREP. COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/spin-offs-for-disaster-warning-and-science/ 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2017); The 11 March Japan Disaster, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. 
PREP. COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/the-11-march-japan-disaster/ (last visited Jan. 
30, 2017). 
 71.  Legal Resources, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N, 
https://www.ctbto.org/member-states/legal-resources/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2017) (citing treaties 
concluded by the CTBTO with countries and international organizations); Establishment, Purpose and 
Activities, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/the-
organization/ctbto-preparatory-commission/establishment-purpose-and-activities/ (last visited Jan. 30, 
2017)  (describing the budget); see generally DAHLMAN ET AL., , supra note 7, at 201–14 (assessing the 
organization’s operations, budgets, and international relations); Asada, supra note 64, at 105–13. 
 72.  Station Profiles, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N, 
https://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/station-profiles/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2017) (showing which 
stations are not yet operational or certified); NIKITIN, supra note 14, at 13 (noting Iran’s 2007 suspension 
of transmission of data from IMS stations on its territory); Lassina Zerbo, The CTBT at 20: Ambition on 
the Road to Success, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2017, at 33 [hereinafter Zerbo, The CTBT at 20] 
(noting that China has recently begun cooperating more with the CTBTO regarding treaty verification 
functions). 
 73.  RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 177–200; see Zerbo, The CTBT at 20, supra note 72, at 34. 
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Law of Treaties74 (VCLT), to refrain from conducting nuclear tests prior to 
entry into force.75 
In addition, some observers have detected worrying signs that the 
regime of provisional application may not be sustainable indefinitely.  The 
concept of a “temporary” mechanism, after all, was not intended to run 
forever, yet twenty years have already elapsed since the initial signature of 
the CTBT.  A sense of “fatigue” may undercut some signatories’ duty of 
affiliation with the still-not-perfected institution, and some may begin to 
question continuing to provide their annual dues, voluntary contributions, or 
other indicia of commitment to the enterprise.76 
One view is that a de facto or “virtual” CTBT already exists, and that it 
is (almost) sufficient for global security needs.  The United States, Russia, 
and China have now refrained from conducting any nuclear tests for more 
than two decades, and the international political momentum behind the 
moratoria and provisional application is so strong that perhaps none of them 
will ever test again, absent some very important adverse developments.77  
But the stronger view is that there is no substitute for a “real” CTBT, fully 
in force and with near-universal legal applicability.  Until that objective is 
accomplished, the demand for reliable measures of arms control and non-
 
 74.  VCLT, supra note 64, art. 18.  Under art. 18, a state that has signed but not yet ratified a treaty 
is “obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose” of the treaty. Id. The United 
States has not ratified the VCLT, but has generally accepted it as binding as an authoritative declaration 
of customary international law. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, at Part III, Introductory Note and § 
312(3); Asada, supra note 64, at 98–103. 
 75.  In a September 15, 2016 joint statement, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States recognized that a nuclear explosion “would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT.” 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Nuclear-Weapon States (Sept. 15, 2016), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/09/261993.htm, archived at https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20170119095033/https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/09/261993.htm. The Security Council then 
endorsed that judgment. S.C. Res. 2310, ¶ 4 (Sept. 23, 2016). Regarding the object and purpose of the 
CTBT, see Jonas, supra note 56, at 1035–40; see Mackay, supra note 7, at 302–05; Asada, supra note 
64, at 94–103; Daniel Rietiker, The (Il?)legality of Nuclear Weapons Tests Under International Law—
Filling the Possible Legal Gap by Ensuring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s Entry into Force, ASIL 
INSIGHTS (The Am. Society of Int’l Law, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 16, 2017, 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/4/illegality-nuclear-weapons-tests-under-international-
law%E2%80%94filling-possible (arguing that the protracted delay in bringing CTBT into force has 
undercut the applicability of VCLT art. 18). 
 76.  DAHLMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 220–21 (noting that CTBT parties have fluctuated in their 
dues payments, and as of 2007, forty-two states had never paid their assessments); David Axe, 
Republicans Move to Strip Away Nuclear Test Ban Funding, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 13, 2017), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/republicans-move-to-strip-away-nuclear-test-ban-funding (reporting 
proposed legislation introduced by Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR) to restrict funding for the CTBTO). 
 77.  See Zerbo, supra note 60 (asserting that “nuclear testing is now widely perceived as a rogue 
activity.”); Bauer and O’Reilly, supra note 52, at 139 (observing that there is a debate about whether a de 
jure global ban against nuclear testing can already be said to exist).   
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proliferation remains unsated.  Moreover, the window of opportunity for 
permanently entrenching the norm against nuclear testing may not remain 
open indefinitely with the CTBT hanging in limbo.78  The picture has now 
been further complicated by rumblings that some in both the United States 
and Russia may be contemplating a return to nuclear testing.79 
5. Failed Attempts to Square the Circle 
Numerous efforts have been launched to retrieve and sustain the “loose 
ends” of CTBT provisional application.  The treaty’s article XIV, while 
creating the immense obstacle against entry into force, also recognized that 
impediment, and called for the convening of a conference “to consider and 
decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be 
undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early 
entry into force of this Treaty.”80  Nine such “Article XIV conferences” have 
 
 78.  Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty, Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty, ¶ 8. CTBT Art. XIV/2009/6, Annex (Oct. 8, 2009) https://www.ctbto.org/ 
fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2009/CTBT-Art.XIV-2009-6.pdf (participants in the ninth Article XIV 
Conference conclude that: “Continuing and sustained voluntary adherence to a moratorium is of the 
highest importance, but does not have the same effect as the entry into force of the Treaty, which offers 
the global community the prospect of a permanent and legally binding commitment to end nuclear weapon 
test explosions or any other nuclear explosions.”); see Nobuyasu Abe, Cementing the Trend Away from 
Nuclear Weapons, CTBTO SPECTRUM, Apr. 2015, at 5; Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte, The Nuclear Test-Ban 
and International Law, CTBTO SPECTRUM, Apr. 2015, at 7; Wolfgang Hoffmann, A View on the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), CTBTO SPECTRUM, Apr. 2015, at 8; Kevin Rudd, A 
U.S.-China Roadmap for CTBT Ratification, CTBTO SPECTRUM, Apr. 2015, at 9; but see Des Browne, 
Verifying the Nuclear Test-Ban: A Regime That Works, CTBTO SPECTRUM, Apr. 2015, at 6; see Zerbo,  
supra note 60 (contending that entry into force of the CTBT “is the only guarantee of a legally binding 
non-testing regime.”); Mackby Nonproliferation Verification, supra note 39, at 732 (reporting that some 
experts opposed provisional application of the CTBT, fearing that “it would provide a screen behind 
which nonparties could hide and delay the full entry into force indefinitely.”); U.N. SCOR, 71st Sess., 
7776th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7776 (Sept. 23, 2016) (comments of Vitaly Churkin speaking on behalf 
of the Russian Federation) (“We believe that the moratoriums on nuclear testing, as important as they are, 
cannot serve as a full-fledged replacement for legally binding international norms. The Treaty, rather than 
national moratoriums, should be the benchmark for States’ responsible behaviour.”); Secretary-General’s 
Message on the International Day against Nuclear Tests, United Nations, August 29, 2017, 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-08-29/secretary-generals-message-international-
day-against-nuclear-tests (asserting that “it is essential” that the CTBT enter into force). 
 79.   See William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Race for Latest Class of Nuclear Arms Threatens to 
Revive Cold War, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/science/atom-
bomb-nuclear-weapons-hgv-arms-race-russia-china.html?mcubz=3  (citing former Secretary of Defense 
William J. Perry as worrying that Russia might resume testing); NIKITIN, supra note 14, at 9 (quoting a 
Russian scholar asserting that Russia might not long sustain a situation in which it has ratified the CTBT 
while the United States and China have not); see Glanz, supra note 58 (noting Trump administration may 
consider resuming testing); John M. Donnelly, Pentagon Panel Urges Trump Team to Expand Nuclear 
Options, ROLL CALL (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/ 
pentagon-panel-urges-trump-team-expand-nuclear-options; Ota, supra note 58; Rietiker, supra note 75. 
 80.  CTBT, supra note 1, art. XIV.2; see RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 249. 
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been convened, the most recent in September 2015 at the United Nations 
headquarters in New York.  These conclaves have succeeded in rallying 
global support for the treaty, in launching outreach activities toward the non-
party states, in underscoring the importance of garnering additional 
ratifications, and in building provisional application, but they have not yet 
managed to bring the key outliers much closer to ratification.81  In particular, 
these conferences have no power to alter the treaty’s constraints upon entry 
into force, or to adopt any other legally binding measures to ameliorate the 
article XIV problem.82 
Numerous other senior-level events,83 as well as annual resolutions in 
the U.N. General Assembly84 and occasional pronouncements of the U.N. 
Security Council85 have similarly attempted to advance the CTBT, but have 
not yet accomplished the ultimate objective.  Brainstorming about other 
potential “measures consistent with international law” has generated creative 
 
 81.   Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty, Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty (Sep. 29, 2015), https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2015/ 
FINAL_DECLARATION.pdf; Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Activities Undertaken by Signatory and Ratifying States under Measure (J) of 
the Final Declaration of the 2013 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty in the 
Period June 2013-May 2015, CTBT-Art.XIV/2015/4 (Sep. 18, 2015), https://www.ctbto.org/ 
fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2015/CTBT_Art_XIV_2015_4.pdf; Conference on Facilitating the Entry 
into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Background Document by the Provisional 
Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization, Prepared for the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT (New York, 
2015), CTBT-Art.XIV/2015/3 (July 30, 2015) https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ 
Art_14_2015/CTBT_Art_XIV_2015_3_E.pdf. 
 82.  See JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 131–37. 
 83.  2016: Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the CTBT, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN 
TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/ctbt-ministerial-meetings/2016/ (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2017) (reporting about the September 2016 meeting of foreign ministers, the latest in a 
series of conferences of senior officials intended to build support for CTBT entry into force); Building a 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND 
DISARMAMENT, http://www.pnnd.org/event/building-political-momentum-nuclear-disarmament (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2017) (describing a recent international conference to support CTBT); see NIKITIN, supra 
note 14, at 31–36 (discussing international efforts on behalf of CTBT); COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN 
TREATY ORG. PREP. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 51–58 (2015) (describing CTBTO outreach 
efforts). 
 84.  See generally G.A. Res. 71/86 (Dec. 5, 2016); G.A. Res. 70/73 (Dec. 7, 2015); G.A. Res. 69/81 
(Dec. 2, 2014); G.A. Res. 68/68 (Dec. 5, 2013) (stressing support for CTBT and reiterating the 
encouragement of states to join the treaty). 
 85. See generally S.C. Res. 2310 (Sept. 23, 2016) (urging states, especially the remaining Annex 2 
holdouts, to join the CTBT without delay); S.C. Res. 1887 (Sept. 24, 2009) (calling on states to sign and 
ratify the CTBT); Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty Nuclear-Weapon States, September 15, 2016, https://2009-
2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/09/261993.htm (reaffirming their commitment to bring the CTBT into 
force) 
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thinking about additional alternative mechanisms for working around the 
constraints of article XIV, but to date none of them has been implemented.86 
The sad fact, then, is that despite the earnest desire of the vast majority 
of the world’s countries and people, and despite the profound benefits that a 
CTBT would provide for global and national security, the treaty is unlikely 
to be perfected—entry into force remains chimerical, even twenty years after 
signature of the treaty.  The regime of provisional application, for all its 
accomplishment, remains an inadequate substitute. 
III. THE WORK-AROUND: AN IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT 
What should be done at this point to rescue the CTBT after so many 
other efforts have failed?  This part of the Article discusses what the treaty 
negotiators really should have written into article XIV; what international 
law allows regarding altering the text of a treaty at different stages of its 
development; what a proposed Implementing Agreement could consist of; 
and what precedents exist for this work-around. 
A. Manageable Entry into Force Provisions 
Several treaties, in the field of arms control and elsewhere, share the 
CTBT’s problem of needing to ensure that the obligations are widely and 
simultaneously shared by many states—in many circumstances, the early 
adopters might be disadvantaged if they are not promptly joined by 
numerous others.  But there are ways to serve that purpose without so 
disabling the ultimate entry into force.87 
 
 86.  RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 12 (discussing a 1991 conference that was convened to consider 
amending the LTBT to convert it into a CTBT); see, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 38–39; see Franz 
Cede, Enhance the Legal Status of the CTBTO Pending the Treaty Entry into Force, in BANNING THE 
BANG OR THE BOMB? NEGOTIATING THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN REGIME 227 (Mordechai Melamud et al. 
eds., 2014) (recommending improvements in the CTBT’s provisional implementing organization); 
Thomas Graham, Jr., A New Pathway to Prohibiting Nuclear Testing, WMD JUNCTION (June 3, 2014), 
http://wmdjunction.com/140603_prohibiting_nuclear_testing.htm archived at https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20161118050231/http://wmdjunction.com/140603_prohibiting_nuclear_testing.htm (proposing that 
the U.N. Security Council could effectuate a test ban via a binding resolution pursuant to chapter VII of 
the U.N. Charter); see generally David A. Koplow, Nuclear Arms Control by a Pen and a Phone: 
Effectuating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Without Ratification, 46 GEO. J. OF INT’L L. 475 (2015).  
Some have detected a substantial diminution in states’ interest in using the formal mechanisms of legally-
binding treaties for effectuating international arrangements, with new a preference for “soft law” 
alternatives that can be quicker, easier and more flexible.  See generally Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. 
Wessel & Jan Wouters, When Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation and Dynamics in International 
Lawmaking, 25 EUR. J. OF INT’L. L. 733 (2014); Timothy Meyer, Collective Decision-making in 
International Governance, AJIL UNBOUND (Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.asil.org/blogs/collective-
decision-making-international-governance-agora-end-treaties. Perhaps this soft law approach could lead 
to new restrictions on nuclear testing, but it has not yet done so. 
 87.  See AUST, supra note 64, at 163–68 (providing a roster of possible entry into force provisions). 
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One common alternative is to specify that the treaty will enter into force 
only when it has been ratified by a sizeable number of states—forty or sixty-
five, for example (although some treaties are content with as few as 
twenty).88  An important variant is to specify that the immediate membership 
by some specific states is required.  Both the LTBT and the NPT, for 
example, were conditioned upon ratification by the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and the United Kingdom.89  Notably, the circumstances of 
international politics at the time those two instruments were concluded did 
not make the prompt participation of either France or China likely, and 
negotiators were not inclined to wait for them.  Both France and China joined 
the NPT more than twenty years later, but neither has ever signed or acceded 
to the LTBT.90 
Another creative alternative is to set a very high criterion for entry into 
force, but then to allow each individual state the option of waiving that 
 
 88.  See, e.g., Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects art. 
5.1, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, [hereinafter CCW] (entered into force December 2, 1983, entered 
into force for the United States September 24, 1995) (requiring ratification by twenty states in order to 
achieve entry into force); Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction art. 17.1, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211 
[hereinafter Ottawa Convention] (requiring forty states’ instruments of ratification); Arms Trade Treaty 
art. 22.1, June 3, 2013, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/ 
doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/52373/Part/I-52373-08000002803628c4.pdf (requiring fifty 
states); LoSC, supra note 4, art. 308.1 (requiring sixty instruments); Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. XXI, 
Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 (entered into force April 29, 1997) (requiring ratification by sixty-five 
states); Lisa Tabassi, The Nuclear Test Ban: Lex Lata or de Lege Ferenda?, 14 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY 
L. 309, 317 (2009) (presenting a chart summarizing the entry into force requirements for several arms 
control treaties); Michie, supra note 64, at 348–49.  See also Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe art. XXII.2, Nov. 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty or 
CFE Treaty] (entered into force July 17, 1992) (requiring ratification by all twenty-two states listed in the 
treaty’s preamble) for which the unanimity requirement has proven problematic in adapting the treaty to 
new security circumstances in Europe. See GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 12, at 596–97. 
 89.  See LTBT, supra note 16, art. III.3 (treaty enters into force when ratified by the three states 
designated as “Original Parties,” the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Some 
treaties combine approaches, requiring ratification by a selected number of states, and additionally 
specifying that certain states must be included in that number. See, e.g., NPT, supra note 2, art. IX.3 
(requiring ratification by forty states in addition to the three depositaries, the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, art. XIV.3, 
Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, (requiring twenty-two states plus the usual three depositaries); Treaty on 
Open Skies, art. XVII.2, Mar. 24, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102−37 (1992) (requiring twenty states, 
specifically including Canada and Hungary as depositaries); Michie, supra note 64, at 349–51. 
 90. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Status of the Treaty, UNODA, 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (last visited Jan. 30, 2017) (China joined the NPT on March 9, 
1992 and France joined on August 3, 1992);Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in 
Outer Space and Under Water, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm (neither 
France nor China has joined the LTBT); JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 111–12. 
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stringency, so the treaty can become operational for it (and for other like-
minded ratifiers) even if dogged holdouts remain.  The best illustration of 
this approach comes from the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, creating a nuclear 
weapons free zone for Latin America.91  There, article 28 nominally 
conditions entry into force upon ratification of the treaty by all the states of 
Latin America, as well as upon ratification of two additional protocols by all 
the states outside the region who were eligible to join them.92  To soften that 
universality requirement, however, the treaty also grants each signatory the 
“imprescriptible right to waive, wholly or in part” the limitation, via a 
declaration formulated at the time it deposits its instrument of ratification or 
subsequently.93 
Taking advantage of that structure, many states did waive the limits—
and treaty advocates automatically urged all eligible states to do so—so the 
treaty gradually entered into force for many Latin American countries 
seriatim, long before it achieved “full” operational status.94  Within eight 
years of its signing, the treaty had entered into force for about three-quarters 
of the then-eligible states.  Prominent holdouts included regional powers 
Argentina (which had signed the treaty in 1967, but not ratified); Brazil and 
Chile (both of which had signed and ratified, but declined to exercise the 
article 28 waiver); and Cuba (which had not signed).95  Years later, in a 
dramatic, coordinated volte-face, the first three of those countries joined the 
treaty (and waived the restriction on entry into force) in 1994.  Cuba joined 
 
 91.  Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, Feb. 14, 
1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 326 [hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco] (entered into force Apr. 22, 1968); see 
generally, GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 12, at 42–45; John R. Redick, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, 
in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 1079, 1081–83 (Richard Dean Burns ed., 
1993); see generally John R. Redick, The Tlatelolco Regime and Nonproliferation in Latin America, 35 
INT’L ORG. 103 (1981). 
 92.  Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 91, art. 28.  Protocol I calls upon nations located outside Latin 
America to apply the treaty’s provisions to their territories (colonies or other dependencies) located inside 
the zone.  Protocol II requires the countries possessing nuclear weapons to respect the non-nuclear nature 
of the zone and to refrain from threatening or using nuclear weapons against treaty parties.  Id. Additional 
Protocol I, II. 
 93.  Id. art. 28.2. See Davis R. Robinson, The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the United States: A Latin 
American Nuclear Free Zone, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 282, 292 (1970) (describing the waiver provision as the 
result of a compromise between negotiators from Brazil and Mexico regarding the stringency of the entry 
into force requirement).  
 94.  INT’L LAW & POLICY INST. (ILPI), SPELLING TLATELOLCO: AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY 
AND POLITICS OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION DISARMAMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN 10-11 (2016), http://nwp.ilpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/BP02-16_GRULAC-REV1-
2.pdf; Redick (1993); Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 91, art. 28. 
 95.   ILPI, supra note 94, at 10; Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, Status of the Treaty, opened for signature Fed. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 326 [hereinafter 
Status of Treaty]. 
KOPLOW PUBLICATION VERSION(DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2017  1:43 PM 
2017] SHERLOCK HOLMES MEETS RUBE GOLDBERG 27 
in only in 2002, so the treaty then entered into force fully for its thirty-three 
parties.96 
Another variant would be for the treaty to initially specify relatively 
“tough” criteria for entry into force, but then to permit modification of that 
rigidity, if necessary, by a subsequent conference of the states that had signed 
or ratified.  That later assemblage could be empowered to bring the treaty 
into force for some or all of the assenting states, even if the original high 
quota were not yet met.97 
Most treaty regimes, therefore, contemplate a broad array of 
international politics regarding entry into force.  A state can use its potential 
ratification as a bargaining chip to induce another state to behave likewise; 
together, they can try to incentivize others to follow suit.  A state can focus 
its attention upon one or more other states of particular concern, pledging to 
join the treaty as soon as it or they do—and that degree of “linkage” can 
generate considerable leverage.  Sometimes, of course, that kind of 
interwoven politics is frustrated, and the targeted state continues nonetheless 
to resist pressure to join the treaty, but the ability to allow even tacit quid pro 
quo negotiations over ratification can prove salutary for building a 
bandwagon effect toward entry into force.98 
In fact, most arms control treaties have grown only slowly and 
incrementally toward universal membership.  The NPT, for example, was 
opened for signature in 1968, and thirty-eight states had ratified it by 1970, 
but many more parties drifted in later.  Notably, several countries that are 
now designated as essential Annex 2 members for the CTBT chose to 
affiliate with the NPT only after it had been in force for some years, 
including Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands (1975), Japan (1976) 
Switzerland (1977), Indonesia (1979), North Korea (1985), Spain (1987), 
China and France (1992), Argentina (1995) and Brazil (1998).  Moreover, 
four key players, India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan, have abstained 
 
 96.   ILPI, supra note 94, at 15−16; Status of Treaty, supra note 95; Sergio González Gálvez, Thirty 
Years of Experience Towards the Consolidation of the First Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the World, in 
NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3, 4 (Pericles Gasparini Alves & Daiana Belinda 
Cipollone eds., 1997). 
 97.   Something akin to this structure was written into the provisions of the NPT, supra note 2, 
regarding duration, rather than entry into force.  For that treaty, the initial period of effectiveness was 
limited to twenty-five years.  At that point, a conference was convened “to decide whether the Treaty 
shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.”  Id. 
art. X.  At the 1995 conference, the parties decided by consensus to extend the treaty indefinitely.  
GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 12, at 106.  In contrast, the CTBT Article XIV conferences, discussed 
supra text accompanying notes 80–82, do not have the authority to make legally binding decisions. 
 98.  See Gálvez, supra note 96, at 4 (citing an allegedly inevitable “expansive force” for all treaties, 
enabling them to grow beyond their initial nucleus of original parties). 
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from the NPT, as they have from the CTBT.  The NPT currently boasts 191 
parties, and is the most nearly universal of arms control treaties.99 
The LTBT likewise drew many adherents promptly after its 1963 
opening for signature, but latecomers among the states that are now 
identified in the CTBT’s Annex 2 included Bangladesh and Colombia 
(1985), Argentina (1986), and Pakistan (1988), while China, France, North 
Korea, Vietnam, and Zaire have still not joined.  Under the more restrictive 
approach of the CTBT, those holdouts would still be blocking entry into 
force for the LTBT, despite the wishes of its 125 current parties.100 
B. Altering a Treaty Text 
A treaty text often remains something of a work-in-progress for an 
extended period of time, and international law allows modification of the 
draft instrument to suit the participants’ evolving needs and perceptions.  For 
present purposes, it is convenient to discern three different stages at which a 
document might be altered: early (i.e., before signature, or at least before 
ratification); late (after the treaty has entered into force); and middle 
(between signature or ratification and entry into force).  The first two are 
relatively easy, at least legally, even if profound political problems may 
persist; the third case, central to the CTBT case study, is far more 
problematic and rare. 
In the first instance, while negotiations are still underway, the evolving 
text of an emerging treaty is quite fluid.  The document molded by 
ambassadors and their delegations is typically styled as being “ad 
referendum,” meaning that approval from national capital authorities is still 
pending.  Because “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,” a text may 
be subject to re-opening, even late in the negotiations; it may be disruptive, 
but is not legally problematic, to propose re-working segments of text that 
had been addressed (and tentatively resolved) much earlier.101  The gyrations 
at the end of the Cold War, for example, roiled the process of concluding the 
1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty,102 requiring quick last-minute 
modification of even key elements such as the formal names of some of the 
 
 99.  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Status of the Treaty, U.N. OFFICE FOR 
DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS (UNODA), http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (last visited Nov. 29, 2017).  
India, Israel, and Pakistan have never joined the NPT; North Korea had joined, but then withdrew. Id. 
 100.  Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 
Status of the Treaty, U.N. OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS (UNODA), 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/test_ban (last visited Nov. 29, 2017).  
 101.  See, e.g., Shabtai Rosenne, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 The 
Application of Part XI: An Element of Background, 29 ISR. L. REV. 491, app. (1995) (discussing various 
alternatives for changing the original contents of the LoSC). 
 102.  CFE Treaty, supra note 88. 
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newly emerging formerly Soviet participating countries.103  In aberrational 
cases, the text of the treaty may have to be altered at or even after 
signature.104 
Second, at the other end of the process, once the treaty has entered into 
force, the mechanism for altering it is usually legally unproblematic, too—a 
well-drafted treaty will contain clear provisions governing these types of 
changes.105  Traditionally, a formal amendment to a treaty is almost the same 
as a whole new treaty, requiring the parties to jump through all the legal and 
procedural hoops they dealt with in creating the treaty in the first place 
(usually requiring both signature and ratification, with all the accompanying 
international and domestic political burdens).  Some treaties are crafted to be 
especially difficult to amend, while others are procedurally more 
amenable.106  Sometimes the amendment process carries its own entry-into-
force thresholds, requiring some substantial degree of consensus among the 
parties before the modification can become viable for any of them.107  The 
amendment might be big or small, might alter the existing text in major or 
minor degree, and might be controversial among the parties or not.  Overall, 
treaty amendments are a fairly common, routine phenomenon.108  In some 
 
 103.  GRAHAM, Sketches, supra note 47, at 207–09 (describing last-minute modifications in the CFE 
Treaty structure, required by the sudden breakup of the U.S.S.R. and the emergence of additional states 
who would have to be subject to the treaty). 
 104.  See, e.g., Treaty Compliance, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION, TECH., 
AND LOGISTICS, http://www.acq.osd.mil/TC/treaties/start1/other/corresp/corrigenda.htm (last visited Jan. 
30, 2017) (finding diplomatic correspondence to correct errors discovered in the START I nuclear arms 
control treaty months after it had been signed by the United States and the Soviet Union); Treaty on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-USSR, July 31, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 
102-20 (1991); VCLT, supra note 64, art. 79 (discussing procedures for correcting errors in the text of a 
signed treaty). 
 105.  See, e.g., LTBT, supra note 16, art. II; NPT, supra note 2, art. VIII; CTBT, supra note 1, art. 
VII. 
 106.  The CTBT is particularly difficult to amend; the process requires a positive vote by a majority 
of treaty parties at an Amendment Conference, with no party casting a negative vote, so even a single 
objecting party can veto any amendment.  CTBT, supra note 1, art. VII.5. Likewise, the LoSC amendment 
process is so cumbersome that it has never been successfully invoked. Irina Buga, Between Stability and 
Change in the Law of the Sea Convention: Subsequent Practice, Treaty Modification, and Regime 
Interaction, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 2 (Donald R. Rothwell et. al. eds., 2015). 
 107.  Under the NPT, for example, an amendment requires the approval by a majority of all parties, 
including the approval by all five parties recognized as possessing nuclear weapons, and by all other 
parties who are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.  NPT, 
supra note 2, art. VIII.2. 
 108.  2016 Treaties and Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/tias/2016/ 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2017) (listing numerous new and amended or extended agreements); see generally 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Panos Merkouris, Re-Shaping Treaties While Balancing Interests of Stability 
and Change: Critical Issues in the Amendment/Modification/Revision of Treaties, 21 AUSTRIA REV. 
INT’L & EUR. L. (forthcoming 2018) (studying the frequency and variability of treaty amendment 
provisions); see generally AUST, supra note 64, at 262–76. 
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instances, the treaty incorporates an additional layer of complexity, by 
establishing two distinct pathways for modifications.  There can be both a 
formal amendment mechanism, as described above, for large or substantial 
changes, and a more expedited alternative, applicable to smaller 
modifications of a technical, administrative, or procedural nature, which can 
be effectuated without a ratification process.109 
The third, middle position, however, where the CTBT currently stands, 
is more legally complex and novel.  International practice rarely confronts 
the dilemma of a treaty that has been negotiated, signed by scores of 
countries and ratified by many or most of them, and still not entered into 
force before the need for alteration becomes prominent.  There is more to it 
than just re-opening the negotiations (because doing so would effectively 
throw away the accumulated ratifications and the years of practice under the 
provisional application) and there is less to it than a formal amendment 
(because until the treaty is in force, no portions of it, including the 
amendment power110 are functional).  Pointedly, in the case of CTBT, the 
treaty likely cannot become operational until the entry into force provisions 
are altered; but conversely, the amendment provisions cannot be used to ease 
the entry into force procedure until after the treaty is effectuated.111 
The VCLT provisions regarding amendment and modification of 
treaties are of only marginal assistance here.  Articles 40 and 41 establish 
that ordinarily, every party to a multilateral treaty is entitled to participate in 
the development of an amendment, and that the amendment is not binding 
upon any state that does not accept it.  Two or more parties to a multilateral 
treaty may ordinarily agree to amend its operation among themselves, but 
this subsequent text has no effect upon their obligations vis-à-vis parties that 
cling to only the original agreement.112 
VCLT article 30 adds that in the event of successive treaties relating to 
the same subject matter, the newer instrument will generally prevail among 
parties to both documents.  But as between a state that has joined both 
 
 109.  See, e.g., CTBT, supra note 1, art. VII.7-8; LoSC, supra note 4, art. 313; AUST, supra note 64, 
at 268.  A treaty can also be modified by the subsequent practice of the parties and by newly-evolving 
customary international law.  Buga, supra note 106, at 1. 
 110.  RAMAKER, supra note 7, at 201–07 (discussing the negotiation of the CTBT amendment 
provisions). 
 111.   Note that pursuant to VCLT art. 24.4, a treaty’s formal provisions regarding its own signature, 
ratification, reservations, and the like will necessarily apply from the time of adoption of the text, but this 
mechanism does not apply to the amendment powers.  VCLT, supra note 64, art. 24.4. 
 112.  VCLT, supra note 64, arts. 40, 41.  A state that joins the treaty after the amendment has entered 
into force would ordinarily be considered a party to the agreement as amended.  Id. art. 40.5. 
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documents and a state that has joined only one, the treaty that they have both 
accepted will provide the governing rules.113 
As elaborated in the immediately following section, this Article 
proposes, in effect, a successive treaty—an Implementing Agreement 
dealing with the same subject matter as the CTBT, to be concluded by as 
many states as possible, and to modify inter se the CTBT’s original 
provisions regarding entry into force.114 
C. The Proposed Implementing Agreement 
This section describes the proposed pathway for modifying the entry 
into force provisions of the CTBT; it paves the way for the comparison to 
the Law of the Sea Convention precedent (discussed in section D) and for 
the presentation of the draft text of my proffered document (displayed in Part 
IV of the Article).  This section highlights two aspects of the Implementing 
Agreement, concerning substance and procedure. 
Substantively, the content of the Implementing Agreement is to 
incorporate by reference the entire contents of the CTBT, and in addition to 
introduce into the CTBT’s article XIV a waiver provision, based on the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco model.115  That new power would enable each 
participating state to speak for itself regarding the timing of entry into force 
of the test ban, rather than being held hostage to the whims of the most 
recalcitrant among the forty-four Annex 2 states.  The waiver is optional, of 
course, and each state could decide to stand pat with the original provision, 
so the test ban would not become functional for that state until all forty-four 
had ratified.  But the hope and expectation would be that many countries, if 
 
 113.  VCLT, supra note 64, art. 30. VCLT art. 31.3 provides that in interpreting a treaty, “[a]ny 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of 
its provisions” shall also be taken into account. Under VCLT art. 59, a treaty may be terminated by the 
conclusion of a subsequent treaty dealing with the same subject matter, if that is the intention of the 
parties, or if the new treaty is incompatible with the original. AUST, supra note 64, at 215–29. Masahiko 
Asada, The NPT and the IAEA Additional Protocol, in Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law 
95, 107-10 (Jonathan L. Black-Branch and Dieter Fleck eds., vol. II, 2016).  Here, the intention would be 
to alter the original CTBT provisions, not to create a novation that would replace the entire treaty. 
 114.  Another illustration of this type of practice in the realm of arms control concerns the 
international legal restraints on anti-personnel land mines. There, two independent, somewhat competing, 
treaties co-exist: Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (which 
limits, but does not prohibit mines) and the Ottawa Convention (which bans mines outright). See CCW, 
supra note 88, at Protocol II, art. 1; Ottawa Convention, supra note 88, art.1.  Some states (such as the 
United States, Russia, and China) have joined only the CCW protocol; some (such as most members of 
NATO) have joined the Ottawa Convention; some have joined both (but it is the more restrictive Ottawa 
Convention that would be controlling); and some have joined neither. The approach in this Article is to 
merge the two test ban instruments, not to retain them as competing alternatives.  
 115.  See Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 91, art. 28. 
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freed from the binds of article XIV, would opt to make legally binding the 
mechanisms that they have been observing provisionally for many years. 
In my proposed version of an Implementing Agreement, each state 
would enjoy multiple options: to have the test ban become effective for itself 
immediately; to insert a one year delay (to see whether other states—either 
in general, or states of particular concern—were joining); and to revert to the 
original article XIV process.  Moreover, a state would be permitted to change 
its mind, becoming more (or less) accommodating, by switching from its 
original position and either accepting or delaying the CTBT’s effectiveness 
for itself.116 
As a procedural matter, the proposed Implementing Agreement would 
allow an expedited or simplified algorithm governing its own entry into 
force.  Unlike the CTBT and most other major arms control treaties, the 
Implementing Agreement would not automatically require signature-
followed-by-ratification.117  Instead, each state could decide for itself 
whether to join the Implementing Agreement via: (a) definitive signature, 
effective immediately;118 (b) signature followed by a one-year delay (again, 
to assess whether other states were following suit), but not requiring the 
further step of ratification; or (c) traditional signature and ratification.  As 
before, each state would enjoy the power to make its own unilateral decision 
about this process, but the purpose of the exercise is to allow and to 
encourage states to join the Implementing Agreement swiftly, including 
avoiding the ratification process, where that domestic constitutional step 
might incur substantial delay.  As before, a state would be allowed to change 
its mind, bringing the Implementing Agreement into force sooner (or later) 
than it had originally scheduled. 
Some states, of course, would be unlikely to change either the substance 
or the procedure of their original CTBT posture—they would prefer to retain 
the “default setting” of the current article XIV.  At the other extreme, some 
activist states might leap at the opportunity to exercise leadership in 
 
 116.  Yet another alternative could be to allow states who sign the Implementing Agreement to apply 
it provisionally, and through that mechanism, to apply the entire CTBT provisionally, pending entry into 
force of the Implementing Agreement. That approach would operationalize the entire CTBT, rather than 
only the provisions that are currently being honored. The Law of the Sea Convention Implementing 
Agreement, discussed infra, provides a contingency for this type of provisional application. LoSC 
Implementing Agreement, infra note 134, art. 7. For the CTBT, however, what is desired at this point is 
a mechanism for true entry into force, not an enhancement of its current provisional application. 
 117.  See VCLT, supra note 64, arts. 11−16, 24 (specifying that a treaty may provide that a state may 
express its consent to be bound through signature alone). 
 118.  See id. art. 12 (providing that a state’s consent to be bound to a treaty may be expressed by 
signature alone). 
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effectuating the test ban, by bringing the Implementing Agreement into force 
for themselves immediately, and also exercising the immediate waiver. 
Still other states might exploit the opportunity for additional 
international gamesmanship, bargaining that “I will act, if you do,” and they 
could play that game at both the stage of entry into force of the Implementing 
Agreement and at exercise of the waiver.  The United States, for example, 
might determine that the test ban should not become operational for itself 
until it was likewise binding upon Russia and China (at least) but that it was 
not necessary for those three nuclear behemoths to await the endorsement by 
North Korea.  Alternatively, a more aggressive approach could be to 
announce a policy of waiting to effectuate the CTBT until, say, India and 
Pakistan had likewise affiliated with the treaty—but if that device ultimately 
proved unavailing for some years, the United States, Russia and China could 
change tactics and proceed to consummate the treaty anyway (along with, 
presumably, dozens of other like-minded states eager to see the CTBT 
become entrenched). 
Importantly, this Implementing Agreement is not an amendment to the 
CTBT—that route is not available until the CTBT is in force.  But it is a 
legally binding tool, and it allows the participating states to bring the entire 
CTBT into force for themselves, not just the parts designated in 1996 as 
being worthy of provisional application.  To emphasize, under this 
Implementing Agreement and waiver approach, the participating states 
would be instituting by reference the complete CTBT as originally crafted, 
except for article XIV; they would not be allowed to pick and choose other 
individual elements of the treaty to incorporate or disregard.119 
As a technical matter, it is not truly the 1996 CTBT that is being brought 
into force by this mechanism.  Analytically, it is the Implementing 
Agreement that becomes legally operational; that instrument incorporates 
the exact contents of the original CTBT (except for article XIV), but they are 
separate legal tools.120  Some of the consequences of this distinction are 
discussed infra, but as a shorthand expression, it is convenient to assert that 
the process proposed here does—indirectly—legally effectuate the full 
substance of the antecedent CTBT. 
For domestic U.S. purposes, if the Implementing Agreement were to 
become available before the United States ratified the CTBT, then 
 
 119.  This restrictive approach is consistent with that of the CTBT, which does not allow reservations 
to the articles and annexes of the treaty, only to the protocol and its annexes.  CTBT, supra note 1, art. 
XV. 
 120.  Under its terms, the 1996 CTBT itself cannot enter into force other than via its article XIV. Id. 
art. XIV. The work-around proposed in this Article, in effect, incorporates by reference the contents of 
the earlier treaty, but what comes into force is the “copy” of the CTBT, rather than the “original.” 
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presumably the two documents would be packaged together, presented as a 
single integrated instrument for the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate, 
and require only one two-thirds vote of approval.121  On the other hand, if 
the United States were to ratify the CTBT relatively soon, and the 
Implementing Agreement were developed and presented only afterwards, in 
order to correct the deficiencies of article XIV and permit entry into force, 
then the U.S. president would face a difficult set of political choices.  It 
would be audacious, indeed, to provide a “definitive signature,” allowing the 
Implementing Agreement to become effective for the United States without 
a second Senate vote of advice and consent—but it may also be unappealing 
to have to fight the same ratification battle a second time for what is, 
essentially, the same treaty.122  Other participating states would also face 
their own calculations of domestic political and constitutional routes, but 
presumably some would be less punctilious about domestic processing, and 
able to take advantage of the expedited alternative. 
Finally, as an institutional matter, the Implementing Agreement could 
address the treaty’s organizational infrastructure, specifying that the current 
Preparatory Commission and Provisional Technical Secretariat will 
become—for the states that exercise the option to bring the CTBT and the 
Implementing Agreement into force among themselves—the full-fledged 
treaty organs.123  The CTBT Organization, consisting of the Conference of 
States Parties, the Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat, would 
emerge as contemplated by article II of the treaty.124  Some of the current 
functions would be largely unaffected (e.g., the ongoing operations of the 
 
 121.  This is the approach the United States adopted regarding the LoSC – the combined package of 
the original treaty, as modified by the Implementing Agreement, was submitted for a single exercise of 
Senate advice and consent. See Message from the President of the U.S. (Oct. 7, 1994), reprinted in 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, WITH ANNEXES, AND THE AGREEMENT 
RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PART XI OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW 
OF THE SEA, WITH ANNEX, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). 
 122.  Conceivably, if the Implementing Agreement were developed subsequently, it could be handled 
as a “treaty executive agreement.” Under that construct, the Senate, when providing its advice and consent 
to the original CTBT, would authorize the President to conclude the Implementing Agreement as a 
modification of it, without requiring a return to the legislative branch for a second endorsement.  That 
route, however, seems politically unlikely here.  See 11 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
MANUAL 700, § 721.2.b(1) (2001).  
 123.   The transition from the Preparatory Commission and Provisional Technical Secretariat to the 
permanent institutions of the CTBT could be tricky, especially since, as noted, the “original” CTBT that 
chartered the current provisional institutions is not precisely the document that will enter into force as the 
Implementing Agreement. It would be useful to have the U.N. General Assembly and the CTBT 
institutional bodies affirmatively endorse the “dual-hatting” and transition, as was done in the case of the 
LoSC. The text of the Implementing Agreement might not need to address this point explicitly; it could 
simply assume that the institutional infrastructure will be applied in full, as are all other aspects of the 
treaty, without any separate textual specification.   
 124.   CTBT, supra note 1, art. II. 
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International Monitoring System and the International Data Center would 
remain intact), but new functions, related to on-site inspections and 
settlement of disputes, would be initiated. 
There is plenty of potential for confusion here, as the states that do not 
join the Implementing Agreement will continue to apply the treaty only 
provisionally and will regard the institutions as still being “preparatory,” 
while other states will graduate to full legal effectiveness.  Calculations of 
assessed dues obligations may become particularly problematic.  But on the 
whole, even a sustained period of operation with such a bifurcated structure 
seems manageable. 
D. The Law of the Sea Convention Precedent 
There is one solid, contemporary, and prominent precedent for the 
approach outlined in this Article, coming from a very different body of 
international law.  In 1982, culminating a decade of broadly multilateral, 
hotly-contested negotiations, the world concluded the Law of the Sea 
Convention (LoSC), regulating a wide range of human activities on, under 
and above the world’s oceans.125  Most of the treaty turned out to be 
relatively uncontroversial, and was quickly accepted by the vast majority of 
seafaring states, even constituting new norms of progressive customary 
international law.126  But one topic proved persistently divisive: the 
provisions of Part XI of the treaty, devoted to establishing a new regime for 
mining of the deep sea bed, far beyond the shores of any state.127 
The United States had fully participated in the evolution of the 
Convention, including endorsing the Part XI provisions for sharing, in some 
equitable fashion, the hard minerals of the deep sea bed as the “common 
heritage of mankind.”128  But the incoming Reagan administration in 1981 
weighed the equities differently, and rejected key elements of Part XI, 
criticizing the mechanisms for allocating and controlling the resources, the 
 
 125.  See generally UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: VOL. VI: A 
COMMENTARY, 3–54 (Myron Nordquist & Satya N. Nandan eds., 2002) [hereinafter Nordquist]; LORI F. 
DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, 1355–60 (6th ed. 2014); 
see generally Warren Christopher, Letter of Submittal, September 23, 1994, reprinted in UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, WITH ANNEXES, AND THE AGREEMENT RELATING TO 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PART XI OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 
WITH ANNEX V, 103d Congress, 2d Sess., S. Treaty Doc. 103–39, (1994); DAVID ANDERSON, MODERN 
LAW OF THE SEA: SELECTED ESSAYS, 49–61 (2008) [hereinafter ANDERSON ESSAYS]. 
 126.  DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 125, at 1355–56, 1431; MARJORIE ANN BROWNE, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., IB95010, THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND U.S. POLICY, 2 (2006) [hereinafter 
BROWNE 2006].  
 127.  LoSC, supra note 4, Part XI; see generally Nordquist, supra note 125, at 64–159. 
 128.  LoSC, supra note 4, art. 136; see generally, Nordquist, supra note 125, at 5–7, 39–48, 95–100; 
DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 125, at 1429–30. 
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mining sites, the technology, and the financial proceeds.  The United States 
thus declined to sign the LoSC and urged its allies and friends to reject it, 
too.129 
Nonetheless, the LoSC proceeded to attract a trickle of signatures and 
ratifications from other states.  After a decade, the 60th ratification was 
deposited, triggering entry into force one year later, on November 16, 
1994.130  At the same time, the ending of the Cold War and the accompanying 
widespread turn from communism toward capitalism underscored the 
importance of bringing the economically developed countries, especially the 
United States—the world’s leading seafaring state, and the country most 
likely to engage in exploitation of the resources of the sea bed—into the 
LoSC regime.  Efforts to revise Part XI therefore intensified in the early 
1990s.131 
However, the “front door” route to modifying the convention—a formal 
amendment of the relevant provisions—was blocked, due to the fact that the 
treaty had not yet entered into force (and even when the amendment 
provisions would become available, they were notably cumbersome and 
time-consuming, sure to generate delay in implementing the necessary 
changes).132  So a race then ensued, to try to modify the provisions of Part 
 
 129.  See generally Nordquist, supra note 125, at 48–54; DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 125, at 
1355–56, 1432; see Bernard H. Oxman, The 1994 Agreement and the Convention, 88 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 
687, 688–89 (1994). 
 130.  LoSC, supra note 4, art. 308; Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and 
Successions to the Convention and Related Agreements, U.N. DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFF. & THE LAW OF 
THE SEA, http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm (last 
updated Sept. 23, 2016) (showing the progression of ratifications of the LoSC).   
 131.  See Nordquist, supra note 125, at 57–59; DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 125, at 1356–57; 
see generally, ANDERSON ESSAYS, supra note 125, at 303–23.  
 132.  The LoSC, supra note 4, contains several distinct provisions on amendments, each with its own 
applicability and impediments. Under art. 312, most treaty provisions are not subject to amendment until 
the treaty has been in force for ten years. Art. 313 contains expedited provisions for quicker amendment 
of certain aspects of the treaty if no party objects, but it is not applicable to deep sea mining. Art. 314 
includes provisions for amendments related to deep sea mining, which might have been available for 
revising Part XI; activists assessed that use of these rules would have required considerable time and were 
of uncertain success. Art. 155 specifies procedures through which a review conference could amend the 
treaty. See also id. art. 311.6 (prohibiting amendments to the basic principle that the deep sea bed 
constituted “the common heritage of mankind”), and art. 316 (regarding the timing of the entry into force 
of amendments to the treaty); see generally ANDERSON ESSAYS, supra note 125, at 312, 332–33 
(recounting analyses by negotiators and experts regarding possible routes for modifying the LoSC); James 
Harrison, MAKING THE LAW OF THE SEA: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 131-
34 (2011) 131–34; Bernard H. Oxman, The 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, in ORDER FOR THE OCEANS AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY, 
15 (Davor Vidas & Willy Ostreng eds., 1999); David H. Anderson, The Mechanisms for Adjusting Part 
XI and Their Relation to the Implementing Agreement, in 1994 RHODES PAPERS: ENTRY INTO FORCE OF 
THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 89, 94 (Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds.,1995); Nikos 
St. Skourtos, Legal Effects for Parties and Nonparties: The Impact of the Law of the Sea Convention, in 
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XI, via a subsequent agreement rather than an amendment, in the remaining 
months before the treaty entered into force.  The device of an Implementing 
Agreement became the favored tool for preserving the accomplishments of 
the states that had already ratified the Convention, while incorporating the 
necessary changes to accommodate the United States.133  The negotiators 
undertook to retain some of the “common heritage of mankind” concept, 
while tempering the provisions for distributing the risks and benefits of deep 
sea bed mining.134 
Remarkably, the diplomats succeeded in that high-stakes, fast-paced 
minuet, and the Implementing Agreement was concluded on July 28, 1994.  
The United States and others signed it and brought it into force provisionally 
on November 16, 1994, the same date that the main LoSC entered into 
force.135  For the United States, the period of provisional application 
 
1994 RHODES PAPERS: ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 187, 190−93 (Myron 
H. Nordquist & John N. Moore eds., 1995). 
 133.   Kenneth Rattray, Assuring Universality: Balancing the Views of the Industrialized and 
Developing Worlds, in 1994 RHODES PAPERS: ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 
55, 65 (Myron H. Nordquist & John N. Moore eds., 1994) (reporting that negotiators “stumbled upon” 
the idea of an implementing agreement); HARRISON, supra note 132, at 90 (asserting that the 1994 
document was the first treaty to be designated as an implementing agreement); Anderson, Mechanisms, 
supra note 132 (surveying options for modifying the LoSC); see generally Tullio Treves, The Agreement 
Completing the UN Law of the Sea Convention: Formal and Procedural Aspects, in 1994 RHODES 
PAPERS: ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 99, 99-103 (Myron H. Nordquist & 
John N. Moore eds., 1995) (discussing the form of any modification). 
 134.   Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Implementing Agreement or LoSC Implementing Agreement]; E.D. Brown, The 1994 
Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Breakthrough 
to Universality? 19 MARINE POL’Y 5, 9 (1995) (noting the negotiators’ determination not to label the new 
document as an “amendment,” although in reality it extended far beyond an “implementation” of the 
original treaty); ANDERSON ESSAYS, supra note 125, at 318, 332 (explaining that use of terms like 
“amend” or “replace” could have signified a renegotiation of the entire treaty, necessitating a new 
approval by national legislatures); id. at 341–47 (assessing mechanisms for adjusting the LoSC); Louis 
B. Sohn, International Law Implications of the 1994 Agreement, 88 AM. J. INT’L LAW 696 (1994); 
HARRISON, supra note 132, at 91–93 (citing the view that the term “implementing agreement” was a 
euphemism for the word “amendment,” and that the original provisions of Part XI were “disapplied”); 
Buga, supra note 106, at 4; Michael W. Lodge, The Deep Seabed, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 
OF THE SEA, 16 n. 6 (Donald R. Rothwell et. al. eds., 2015) (suggesting that the Implementing Agreement 
“sidesteps” the question of whether it modifies or amends the original convention); Treves, supra note 
133, at 104–05 (discussing the “thin line” between implementation and amendment). But see Henrique 
R. Valle, Adjustments to Part XI: United Nations Efforts (The Negotiation Process), in 1994 RHODES 
PAPERS: ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 47, 52 (Myron H. Nordquist & John 
N. Moore eds., 1995) (insisting that the Convention has not been “amended”). 
 135.  The Implementing Agreement was provisionally applied from November 16, 1994, and entered 
into force on July 28, 1996.  See BROWNE 2006, supra note 126, at 7; Brown, supra note 134, at 8; 
Michael C. Wood, International Seabed Authority: The First Four Years, 3 MAX PLANCK UNYB 173 
(1999); Moritaka Hayashi, The 1994 Agreement for the Universalization of the Law of the Sea 
Convention, 27 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 31, 33–36 (1996); Rosenne, supra note 101, at 494–96; Treves, 
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continued for only four years; when the Senate declined to provide advice 
and consent, the United States stood (and still stands) entirely outside the 
LoSC regime.136  For 168 other states, the modified structure is now in place, 
and has been operational for more than two decades.137 
The LoSC Implementing Agreement (unlike that proposed in this 
Article for CTBT) is lengthy and complex—the altered arrangements for the 
new mining regime require many pages of specifications to unravel detailed 
aspects of the original Part XI.138  Procedurally, however, there are important 
similarities to what is proposed here, especially regarding the mechanism for 
affording each participating state an expedited or simplified procedure for 
adopting the Implementing Agreement, rather than requiring the usual 
laborious steps of signature and ratification.  The remainder of this section 
compares the two approaches.139 
 
supra note 133, at 111–15.; see generally Nordquist, supra note 125, at 57–63; DAMROSCH & MURPHY, 
supra note 125, at 1357–58, 1432.   
 136.  Lists of Ratifications, supra note 130.  The United States applied both the Convention and the 
Implementing Agreement on a provisional basis for four years starting on November 16, 1994. See 
generally,  BROWNE 2006, supra note 126, at 8–9; DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 125, at 1357–58; 
Nordquist, supra note 125, at 63; Sohn, supra note 134; Jonathan I. Charney, U.S. Provisional Application 
of the 1994 Deep Seabed Agreement, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 705 (1994).  
 137.  Lists of Ratifications, supra note 130; see generally, Wood, supra note 135.  For comparison, 
note that states have also concluded another implementing agreement to the LoSC, to deal with 
conservation and management of certain stocks of fish, Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to 
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, August 
4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995).  The 1995 Implementing Agreement is more free-standing than the 1994 
Implementing Agreement and does not alter the original treaty; unlike the agreement relating to Part XI, 
a state may join the fish stocks agreement without joining the LoSC.  HARRISON, supra note 132, at 103–
08. 
 138.  Among other alterations, the Implementing Agreement revised the decision-making power 
structure of the treaty’s organs, to enhance the authority of the United States; removed production limits 
that would have inhibited deep sea mining; mitigated the requirements for transferring private mining 
technology to the treaty’s mining arm; and reduced fees charged to miners.  See BROWNE 2006, supra 
note 126, at 6–8; Oxman, supra note 129, at 695; Brown, supra note 134, at 10–15; see D.H. Anderson, 
Resolution and Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea: A General Assessment, 55 ZAÖRV, 275, 284–88 (1995), 
http://www.zaoerv.de/55_1995/55_1995_2_a_275_289.pdf; Fact Sheet, How the Law of the Sea 
Convention Was Fixed to Address President Reagan’s Concerns, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, (Feb. 15, 2012), 
https://www.state.gov/e/oes/lawofthesea/factsheets/183994.htm [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20170113150337/https://www.state.gov/e/oes/lawofthesea/factsheets/183994.html]; Wood, supra note 
135.  
 139.  See Gabriella Venturini, Test Bans and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, in 
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 133, 151 (Jonathan L. Black-Branch & Dieter 
Fleck eds., 2014) (positing an instrument modeled on the LoSC Implementing Agreement as a mechanism 
for modifying the CTBT to permit its entry into force, but suggesting that the circumstances contributing 
to success in the LoSC instance were unique, and concluding that it is “highly unlikely” that CTBT states 
would be inclined to undertake such a complex process). 
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1. Similarities.   
Both the LoSC Implementing Agreement and the proposed CTBT 
Implementing Agreement give each state some choices.  A state can join the 
revision document simply by signing, not subject to ratification; by signature 
subject to a twelve-month waiting period; or by signature followed by 
ratification.140 
In the LoSC version, the middle option, allowing up to one year’s 
waiting period before joinder, is available only to a state that had already 
deposited its instrument of ratification (or the equivalent) for the original 
LoSC.  In my proposal, that path is available for all states.141  For the LoSC 
Implementing Agreement, two states (Belize and Kenya) used the “definitive 
signature” mechanism, and sixteen others adopted the “simplified 
procedure” to join within one year, without an act of ratification.142 
In both the LoSC and CTBT versions, a state is prevented from joining 
only the Implementing Agreement; if it wishes to adhere, it must previously 
or simultaneously accept the original treaty, too.143  That limitation is more 
important for the LoSC, where a state might conceivably have wanted to 
affiliate with only the revised deep sea bed mining provisions, while not 
joining the rest of the treaty.  In the case of CTBT, in contrast, there is no 
substantive difference between the content of the original treaty and the 
Implementing Agreement.  Still, the prospect of creating two classes of 
parties to either treaty is problematic, at least as a formal matter: some states 
will have ratified only the original document, while others will have 
consented to both. 
Also, both instruments specify some threshold number of ratifications 
required before the Implementing Agreement can enter into force.  For 
LoSC, participation by forty states is required, with the further qualification 
 
 140.  LoSC Implementing Agreement, supra note 138, art. 4.3; proposed CTBT Implementing 
Agreement, infra Part IV, art. I.1; Hayashi, supra note 135, at 32–33; Brown, supra note 134, at 6–7; 
HARRISON, supra note 132, at 94; Treves, supra note 133, at 109–10.  The United States signed subject 
to ratification.  Commentary—The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 
Agreement on Implementation of Part XI, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
THE SEA, WITH ANNEXES, AND THE AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PART XI OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, WITH ANNEX 76, 103d Congress, 2d Sess., S. 
Treaty Doc. 103-39, (1994); ANDERSON ESSAYS, supra note 125, at 319–20. 
 141.  Compare LoSC Implementing Agreement, supra note 134, art. 5.1 with proposed CTBT 
Implementing Agreement, infra, Part IV, art. I.1 see also Treves, supra note 133, at 107–110. 
 142.   U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS & THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFF. OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, LAW OF THE 
SEA BULL. NO. 89, at 1 (2015) (including chart recapitulating status of the Convention and Implementing 
Agreement as of November 30, 2015); Hayashi, supra note 135, at 33. 
 143.  Compare LoSC Implementing Agreement, supra note 134, art. 4.2 with proposed CTBT 
Implementing Agreement, infra Part IV, art. I.4; see also Harrison, supra note 132, at 93–94 (emphasizing 
that the LoSC and the Implementing Agreement are to be construed as a single instrument). 
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that at least seven of those states must come from a designated group of 
“pioneer investors” in deep sea mining, and that at least five of those must 
qualify as being economically developed.144  In my proposal, the threshold 
is lower, requiring only twenty states, without any specialized roster of 
essential participants.145 
Finally, as a political matter, the execution of the novel LoSC process 
benefited greatly from the explicit endorsements by the U.N. General 
Assembly and the LoSC administrative bodies.146  The CTBT and its 
Implementing Agreement should follow that avenue, too, although that 
subject is not addressed explicitly in these documents. 
2. Differences 
The LoSC Implementing Agreement purports to prohibit a country from 
henceforth joining the original LoSC without accepting the Implementing 
Agreement, too.  This provision is designed to prevent further worsening of 
the paradox of having some states become party to both the first and second 
documents while others affiliate with only the first.  It is less important for 
the CTBT, and is omitted from this Article’s proposed draft text, because, 
again, there is no substantive difference between the two test ban accords, 
and because my Implementing Agreement would still afford each state the 
option of insisting upon the difficult entry into force provisions of the 
original article XIV, if it so chose.147 
Moreover, there is something of a legal puzzle about whether a 
subsequent treaty (such as an implementing agreement) can validly foreclose 
states’ options regarding joining an earlier treaty.  If the original instrument 
would otherwise, by its own terms, remain open for signature or accession 
by additional states, it is not clear how a later document crafted and signed 
by other states can terminate that option.  In any event, that problematic 
 
 144.  LoSC Implementing Agreement, supra note 134138, art. 6.1; Sohn, supra note 134, at 698; see 
generally Anderson, Mechanisms, supra note 133, at 282 (identifying the key pioneer investing states); 
Hayashi, supra note 135, at 37; ANDERSON ESSAYS, supra note 125, at 320 (explaining that one reason 
for specifying the participation of wealthy pioneer investors was to ensure that the developed countries 
would be available to provide the necessary financial support for the treaty’s infrastructure). 
 145.  Compare LoSC Implementing Agreement, supra note 134, art. 6.1 with proposed CTBT 
Implementing Agreement, infra Part IV, art. II.4. 
 146.  G.A. Res. 48/263 (July 28, 1994) (endorsing unanimously the Implementing Agreement); 
James Harrison, MAKING THE LAW OF THE SEA: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 86–90 (2011) (emphasizing the role that the United Nations General Assembly played in endorsing 
and legitimating the effort to revise the LoSC).   
 147.  Compare LoSC Implementing Agreement, supra note 134, art. 4.1 with proposed CTBT 
Implementing Agreement, infra Part IV, art. I. 
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aspect of the LoSC Implementing Agreement is not carried forward in the 
CTBT variant.148 
It should be noted that the proffered CTBT Implementing Agreement 
multiplies, not restricts, states’ options.  Each country would be afforded the 
two-step choice: a) whether to join the Implementing Agreement at all; and 
b) if it does join, whether to exercise the option to waive the strict CTBT 
entry into force restrictions.  Moreover, each party has the further choice to 
express its consent to either of those actions: a) immediately; b) with effect 
after a one year delay; or c) only after ratification.149  In addition, a state 
would be permitted to change its mind, altering its initial preferences in light 
of subsequent events. 
It is also noteworthy that a state that decides to join the draft CTBT 
Implementing Agreement would be required to ratify the original CTBT first 
(or simultaneously), even if, after doing so, it declined to exercise the waiver 
operation and bring the CTBT obligations into force for itself immediately 
(or after one year).  Therefore, an Annex 2 state in such a situation would 
count toward the fulfillment of article XIV, bringing eventual formal entry 
into force of the CTBT one step closer.  This might, for some states, be an 
attractive mechanism for expressing support for the treaty without yet 
incurring immediate additional obligations under it. 
For each treaty, the messiness will persist in creating two groups of 
parties, possessing overlapping but not identical sets of obligations.150   But 
 
 148.  As a practical matter, the newer instrument could be said to “spoil” the original, and the 
depositary could be instructed not to accept any new signatures or instruments of ratification of the 
original treaty that did not simultaneously embrace the newer. But VCLT, supra note 64, art. 40.5 
contemplates that, in general, a state joining an amended treaty could elect not to accept the amendment. 
Compare with LoSC Implementing Agreement, supra note 134, art. 4.1. See Brown, supra note 134, at 7 
(calling this aspect of the LoSC Implementing Agreement “surprising”); Treves, supra note 133, at 108–
09; Hayashi, supra note 135, at 32 (discussing the operation of the “principle of simultaneous acceptance” 
of the related agreements); see ANDERSON ESSAYS, supra note 125, at 346 (asserting that the LoSC 
Implementing Agreement takes into account the position of states that had previously ratified the original 
treaty).  
 149.   International practice offers several precedents of treaties that are structured to afford states 
multiple options regarding the legal obligations they assume.  The Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, for example, consists of a main treaty that is basically just a chapeau, under which is a series 
of protocols dealing with specific weapons (such as blinding lasers, land mines, and incendiaries) that 
each party can elect to join a la carte.  See CCW, supra note 88. Likewise MARPOL 73/78, discussed 
infra, contains a series of optional annexes dealing with particular sources of marine pollution; when (or 
after) joining the main treaty, each party can determine which of these annexes to accept.  
 150.  In fact, in both the LoSC and CTBT instances, there are more than simply two groups of 
relevant states. A state may ratify, sign but not ratify, or not sign each of the two instruments (the original 
treaty and the relevant implementing agreement), and the network of overlapping and inconsistent rights 
and obligations could become quite complex. The most fundament dichotomy would be between states 
that have joined only the original agreement vs. states that have joined both the original and the 
implementing agreement.   
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that “duality of regimes” problem is much more extensive for the LoSC than 
for the CTBT.151  In the LoSC case, a state that had joined the original treaty 
but not the Implementing Agreement could, in principle, insist upon 
fulfillment of its original bargain, unimpaired by the subsequent accord 
reached by only some of its initial treaty partners.  That state, in theory, could 
demand that the original “common heritage of mankind” mechanism for 
mining be implemented, regardless of how it had been modified inter se by 
others.  As of September 2016, some eighteen countries are in that 
situation;152 in practice they have not pressed those claims, and the overall 
treaty regime could not implement both sets of relationships in any 
meaningful fashion.  In practice, only the Implementing Agreement is being 
effectuated for deep seabed mining, but the legal basis for that 
accommodation is uneasy.153 
For the CTBT, the disconnect arises from the fact that a state that had 
joined only the original treaty would be subject only to its provisional 
application—it would owe support to the IMS and the other aspects of the 
monitoring system, but would not have committed itself to participate in the 
on-site inspection or dispute-resolution mechanisms.  Honoring those 
additional features would be a burden only for the states that have voluntarily 
accepted the Implementing Agreement.  But any “conflict” between the 
rights and obligations of the two groups of states is relatively quite muted.154 
 
 151.  As noted, in the case of CTBT, the proposed Implementing Agreement is a distinct instrument 
which incorporates the text of the original treaty (except for article XIV); it is the Implementing 
Agreement, rather than the original CTBT, that will initially enter into force. In contrast, in the LoSC 
case, both the original treaty and the Implementing Agreement entered into force almost simultaneously. 
 152.   LAW OF THE SEA BULL. 89, supra note 142; Lists of Ratifications, supra note 130. This diverse 
group includes Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, 
Egypt, Iraq, and Somalia, among others.  See Treves, supra note 133, at 115−16 (examining the conflict 
if some parties to the original LoSC do not join the Implementing Agreement); HARRISON, supra note 
132, at 94–95. 
 153.  Lodge, supra note 134, at 16 n. 8; Buga, supra note 106, at 5; Brown, supra note 134, at 18; 
Int’l Seabed Auth., Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority 
Under Article 166, ¶ 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, at 2, ¶ 5, ISBA/16/A/2 
(Mar. 8, 2010) (noting that even those states that have not joined the Implementing Agreement 
nonetheless necessarily participate in the work of the treaty bodies based on that Implementing 
Agreement; if those states were to join the Implementing Agreement, it “would remove an incongruity 
that currently exists for those States.”); see Jutta Brunnee, Treaty Amendments, in THE OXFORD GUIDE 
TO TREATIES 347, 364 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012) (observing that states that became party to the original 
LoSC but not to the Implementing Agreement “will find it increasingly difficult to maintain their original 
interpretation of Part XI.”); HARRISON, supra note 132, at 95–97; R.R. CHURCHILL AND A.V. LOWE, THE 
LAW OF THE SEA 20-21 (3rd ed. 1999). The unanimous U.N. General Assembly resolution of support for 
the Implementing Agreement indicates strong global support for the process, even among states that have 
not affirmatively acted to join the Implementing Agreement; perhaps that tacit acquiescence can amount 
to a waiver of any potential objection to the process. 
 154.  In one sense, a state that joins only the original CTBT while others create the Implementing 
Agreement would lose its “right” to have the treaty not come into force for anyone until all forty-four 
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E. Other Precedents 
Finally, it should be noted that in addition to the LoSC, international 
legal practice has had other occasions to wrestle with the question of a treaty 
that suffers from inadequate support for entry into force, but that should not 
be wholly consigned to the scrap heap.  For example, the 1973 International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) is a 
leading instrument protecting the maritime environment.155  The 1973 
version of the treaty specified that it would enter into force when ratified by 
fifteen states with a combined merchant fleet representing fifty percent of 
the world’s gross shipping tonnage.  It also mandated that in order to join the 
treaty, a state would have to accept both of its mandatory annexes (dealing, 
respectively, with pollution by oil, and by other chemicals).156 
By 1976, the treaty had been ratified by only three states (Jordan, Kenya 
and Tunisia), representing less than one percent of the world’s merchant 
shipping, and the prospects for securing the necessary additional ratifications 
seemed bleak.  A spate of catastrophic tanker accidents then underscored the 
urgency of undertaking meaningful, prompt action.157  States accordingly 
 
Annex 2 states have ratified. That state can, of course, still ensure that the treaty does not come into force 
for itself until art. XIV is satisfied, but it would lose its ability to hold hostage the entry into force for all 
other states. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the CTBT negotiators had contemplated, but rejected, 
inserting this type of “waiver” provision into article XIV of the original treaty.  So a state that clings to 
the original version of the treaty may be said to suffer a compromise of part of its original bargain, which 
suggests some possible tension with arts. 34 and 35 of the VCLT, supra note 64 (asserting that a treaty 
generally does not create rights or obligations for states that do not join). In this instance, that expectation 
is not a right that should be protected; it is not illegitimate for other states to depart from it by a subsequent 
Implementing Agreement operational only among themselves.  See VCLT, supra note 64, arts. 30, 41 
(noting that a party to an earlier treaty (or to an unamended treaty) does not lose treaty rights when other 
parties conclude a subsequent agreement on the same subject matter (or an amendment to the original 
treaty)). Calculating the dues of CTBT parties would become more complex under this initiative; states 
for which the treaty was in force would be obligated to support the entire treaty structure, including the 
costs of on-site inspection operations, while the states that were bound only by the commitment to 
provisional application would pay less. 
 155.   International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), 
November 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973) [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78], modified by Protocol of 1978 
Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, February 17, 1978, 
1341 U.N.T.S. 3, 17 I.L.M. 546 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 MARPOL Protocol] [collectively referred to 
hereinafter as MARPOL 73/78]; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL), INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/ 
Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Prevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-(MARPOL).aspx (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2017); Edgar Gold, GARD HANDBOOK ON MARINE POLLUTION, 68–70, 98–122 (2d ed. 
1998); Douglas Brubaker, MARINE POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, 
122–27 (1993). 
 156.   MARPOL 73/78, supra note 155, arts. 1, 14, 15, Annex I, Annex II. 
 157.   MARPOL73-78: Brief History – List of Amendments to Date and Where to Find Them, INT’L 
MARITIME ORG. (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law); GOLD, supra note 
155, at 40; Brubaker, supra note 155. 
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negotiated a 1978 protocol, which modified, expanded, and absorbed the 
original agreement.  That protocol—effectively an implementing agreement, 
under a different moniker158—specified that a state need affiliate only with a 
modified version of Annex 1, and provided an additional several years for 
states to negotiate revisions to Annex 2 and adapt to its requirements.159 
States were permitted to join the resulting combined package—a kludge 
generally treated as a single instrument and referred to as MARPOL 73/78—
via signature alone or via signature followed by ratification.160  That package 
entered into force in 1983; it has subsequently been modified several more 
times, via the usual amendment procedures (and via an additional 1997 
protocol), and has attracted 155 parties.161 
The 1993 START II Treaty offers a somewhat similar case study in a 
bilateral context.162  There, after the agreement had been negotiated and 
signed, the U.S. Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification on 
January 26, 1994.  However, the Russian Duma did not vote affirmatively 
until April 14, 2000, leaving too little time to meet the treaty’s deadlines (in 
2001 and 2003) for accomplishing the planned destruction of specified 
nuclear weapons.  Anticipating this problem, the United States and Russia 
therefore concluded a protocol on September 26, 1997, that extended some 
of the deadlines to December 31, 2004 or December 31, 2007.163  The 
 
 158.   States working in 1994 to modify the original LoSC via the mechanism of an implementing 
agreement were well aware of the MARPOL 73/78 precedent, but chose different vocabulary. ANDERSON 
ESSAYS, supra note 125, at 318.  
 159.   1978 MARPOL Protocol, supra note 155, arts. I, II; Rosenne, supra note 101, at 496 n. 16; 
Gini Mattson, MARPOL 73/78 and Annex I: An Assessment of Its Effectiveness, 9 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. 
& POL’Y 175, 180 (2006); see Andrew Griffin, MARPOL 73/78 and Vessel Pollution: A Glass Half Full 
or Half Empty?, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 489, 490–91 (1994). 
 160.   MARPOL 73/78, supra note 155, art. IV; Yoshio Sasamura, Implementation of MARPOL 
73/78, in INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 121−25 (Feb. 1985), 
http://ioscproceedings.org/doi/abs/10.7901/2169-3358-1985-1-121; Ilian Djadjev, How to Comply with 
MARPOL 73/78 (May 15, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2617379. 
Uruguay was the only state to join via signature alone.  Int’l Maritime Org., Status of Multilateral 
Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or Its 
Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other Functions, 106, 107, 111 (Jan. 11, 2017), 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-
%202017.docx.pdf.  
 161.   IMO Brief History, supra note 157. The combined treaty now embraces six technical annexes.  
Id. 
 162.   Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction 
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty), U.S.-Russ., Jan. 3, 1993, S. TREATY. 
DOC. 103-1, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102887.htm. 
 163.   Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of January 3, 1993, U.S.-Russ., Sept. 26, 
1997, https://fas.org/nuke/control/start2/text/index.html ; see also Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II 
Chronology, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, https://fas.org/nuke/control/start2/docs/strt-chr.htm.  
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protocol was not effectuated as an “amendment” to START II, because until 
that treaty entered into force, its amendment provisions were not operational; 
the protocol was, instead, another version of an implementing agreement.  
Due to the protocol’s alteration of the destruction schedule, START II 
required a second vote of approval by the legislatures in both countries, 
which did not occur, so neither the treaty nor the protocol ever became 
legally functional.164 
IV. THE PROPOSED TEXT OF THE CTBT IMPLEMENTING 
AGREEMENT 
This part of the Article puts into practice the principles and propositions 
adduced above, by offering a draft text of the CTBT Implementing 
Agreement.  It is not intended as a complete treaty, ready for state signature, 
but it does provide a vehicle for illustrating the operation of the strategies 
outlined in the Article, and for identifying some of the options that 
negotiators would have to resolve.165  Working through the legal text of such 
a proposal is always more illuminating—for the drafter and the reader 
alike—than stopping at a more generic level of argumentation and 
analysis.166 
Draft Text: 
Implementing Agreement 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
 
Preamble167 
The Parties to this Implementing Agreement, 
Recognizing the important contribution of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty as an effective measure toward nuclear disarmament and 
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons,168 
 
 164.   See, GRAHAM AND LAVERA, supra note 12, at 889, 1165; see, Michie, supra note 64, at 360–
61. 
 165.  This Article does not address the important question of what forum should be used to negotiate 
the proposed Implementing Agreement. There may be several alternative venues available, and the choice 
among them could carry both legal and political implications, but is beyond the scope of the current work. 
 166.  See, e.g., Anastassov, supra note 53, at 96 (presenting a proposed draft text of an optional 
protocol on provisional application of portions of the CTBT). For ease of reference, this document will 
be cited as “proposed CTBT Implementing Agreement,” or (if the context is clear in differentiating it 
from the LoSC Implementing Agreement, supra note 134) as “Implementing Agreement.” 
 167. A treaty preamble does not ordinarily include legally binding obligations, but can be useful in 
interpreting the object and purpose of the document.  See Jonas, supra note 56, at 1038; Tabassi, supra 
note 88, at 317. 
 168.  This paragraph is based on the CTBT preamble, third paragraph, supra note 1. 
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Wishing to facilitate universal participation in the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty and to promote its prompt entry into force,169 
Stressing the importance of each state’s sovereign decision-making 
regarding the procedures and timing for effectuating its participation in the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and desiring to increase states’ 
options,170 
Grateful for the success of provisional application of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the enormous contributions of the Preparatory 
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, 
the Provisional Technical Secretariat, and the Executive Secretary, and 
desiring to make their accomplishments permanent,171 
Have agreed as follows, 
Article I 
1.   Any state172 may express its consent to be bound by this Implementing 
Agreement by: 
a.  definitive signature, effective immediately;173 
b.  signature, effective after one year; or 
c.  signature followed by ratification. 
2.  Any state that initially selects option b in article I.1 may switch to option 
a. or option c., by notification to the Depositary prior to the expiration of the 
one year period. 
3.  Any state that initially selects option c. in article I.1 may switch to option 
a. or option b., by notification to the Depositary prior to the deposit of its 
instrument of ratification. 
 
 169.  This paragraph is based on the LoSC Implementing Agreement, sixth preambular paragraph, 
supra note 134.  
 170.  This paragraph acknowledges that the proposed Implementing Agreement cannot compel states 
to join the effort to revise the CTBT or to depart from holding out against entry into force of the CTBT.  
Instead, the concept is to provide each state with additional options regarding both substance and 
procedure that it might decide to pursue in the exercise of its sovereign decision-making. 
 171.  This paragraph constitutes an acknowledgement of the contributions of the provisional CTBT 
organization and personnel, and their success in preparing for entry into force of the treaty. 
 172.  This version does not confine the use of the simplified or expedited procedure to only those 
states that had previously ratified the original treaty, as the LoSC Implementing Agreement does. 
 173.  In this context, the consent would be given immediately, but would not become operational 
until after the Implementing Agreement has received consent from sufficient other states, and then the 
passage of one year, pursuant to art. I.6. 
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4.  No state may express its consent to be bound by this Implementing 
Agreement174 unless it has previously or simultaneously deposited its 
instrument of ratification or accession175 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty.176 
5.  This Implementing Agreement shall be open for signature indefinitely.177 
6.  This Implementing Agreement shall enter into force for consenting states 
one year178 after the twentieth state expresses its consent to be bound by it.179  
Thereafter, it shall enter into force for each additional consenting state upon 
the effective date of its expression of consent. 
7.  In the event of any inconsistency between this Implementing Agreement 
and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the provisions of this 
Implementing Agreement shall prevail.180 
Article II 
1.  When a state expresses its consent to be bound by this Implementing 
Agreement, it shall declare that the terms of the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty other than article XIV.1 will enter into force for it: 
 
 174.  As drafted, this provision would allow a state to sign the Implementing Agreement even if it 
has not yet signed and ratified the CTBT, if it signs the Implementing Agreement subject to ratification; 
the state could not then proceed to ratify the Implementing Agreement until it had ratified the CTBT, too. 
An alternative would be to specify that a state may not even sign the Implementing Agreement until it 
had previously (or simultaneously) ratified the CTBT. The current version would allow a signature by, 
for example, a state in which the executive branch was favorably disposed to the CTBT and wanted to 
take a step toward the Implementing Agreement, even if it could not yet persuade the legislative branch 
to support ratification of the CTBT. 
 175.  This provision means that any state that joins the Implementing Agreement will have also 
joined the CTBT; for a state listed in Annex 2, it will therefore count toward satisfying the requirements 
of art. XIV.1, even if it elects not to waive the requirement that the provisions of the CTBT will become 
operational for it only when all forty-four designated states have joined. 
 176.  In the LoSC version of this process, there is a parallel provision prohibiting a state from now 
joining the original treaty without simultaneously accepting the Implementing Agreement. That 
restriction is unnecessary here (since there would be little point to joining this Implementing Agreement 
without joining the CTBT) and because it is legally problematic for a subsequent treaty to prevent states 
from joining an earlier one. 
 177.  Many treaties are open for signature for only a limited period of time; after that point, a state 
seeking to join the treaty does so via depositing an instrument of accession. The option presented here is 
a bit simpler. 
 178.  The Implementing Agreement could shorten this period to 180 days, as many treaties (including 
the CTBT) do. 
 179.  A low number of state acceptances is appropriate here, since each state still retains options 
regarding the timing of the effectuation of its legal obligations to refrain from conducting nuclear tests. 
Alternatively, the Implementing Agreement could also require that some specified states (such as the five 
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council) would have to join before the Implementing 
Agreement becomes effective for any state. 
 180.  This paragraph is based on the LoSC Implementing Agreement, supra note 134, art. 2.1. 
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a.  immediately;181 
b.  after one year; or 
c.  pursuant to the terms of article XIV.1 of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. 
2.  Any state that initially selects option b. in article II.1 may switch to option 
a. or option c., by notification to the Depositary prior to the expiration of the 
one year period. 
3.  Any state that initially selects option c. in article II.1 may switch to option 
a. or option b., by notification to the Depositary at any time. 
4.  The terms of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty other than 
article XIV.1 shall enter into force for all states that have accepted its entry 
into force one year182 after twenty states183 have accepted it.184 
5.  The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization shall become 
operational on the date the Treaty enters into force.185 
Article III 
1.   The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the depositary of 
this Implementing Agreement.186 
2.   The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts of this 
Implementing Agreement are equally authentic.187 
In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, 
have signed this Implementing Agreement. 
 
 181.  In this context, the consent would be given immediately, but would not become operational 
until after the Implementing Agreement has received consent from sufficient other states, and then the 
passage of one year, pursuant to art. II.4. 
 182.  The Implementing Agreement could shorten this period to 180 days, as many treaties (including 
the CTBT) do. 
 183.  A low number of state acceptances is appropriate here, since each state still retains options 
regarding the timing of the effectuation of its legal obligations. Again, the Implementing Agreement could 
require that some specified states (such as the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council) 
would have to join before the CTBT becomes effective for any state. 
 184.   The Implementing Agreement could omit this provision altogether, allowing the CTBT to 
become operational for each state, one by one, on the dates they individually accept it.  
 185.   This provision may be unnecessary, since the concept is that all aspects of the CTBT will 
become operational for states accepting the Implementing Agreement. But it may be useful to call out the 
institutional infrastructure for special mention here. 
 186.   This is a standard provision in international agreements, such as in the LoSC Implementing 
Agreement, supra note 134, art. 9. 
 187.   This is a standard provision in international agreements, such as in the LoSC Implementing 
Agreement, supra note 134, art. 10. 
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Done at XXX, on this (date). 
[National signatures] 
V. CONCLUSION 
What are the key lessons from this analysis of an alternative mechanism 
for effectuating the CTBT?  First, it is apparent that going through the “front 
door”—securing the necessary ratifications in order to bring the treaty into 
effect as originally drafted—would be preferable.  The negotiators had a 
valid point in insisting that participation by all forty-four identified states 
would provide the strongest basis for ensuring that the CTBT’s benefits and 
burdens would be shared equally and simultaneously by all the most essential 
participants in global nuclear security affairs. 
However, more than twenty years of frustrated experience has made 
manifest that this preferred strategy simply will not succeed in any 
foreseeable future.  There is little sign that the eight Annex 2 holdouts will 
soon change course, and even if some of them did, it requires truly magical 
thinking to suppose that rogue regimes will acquiesce to the wishes and 
needs of the rest of the global community.  At the same time, the imperative 
for effectuating the CTBT has become only more urgent.  Both for its 
contribution to interdicting future developments in a nuclear arms race and 
as an indispensable element in preserving the global consensus underpinning 
the nuclear nonproliferation regime, CTBT is needed more now than ever.  
The world has tried to “work through” the mess created by article XIV for 
two decades; now it’s time to try to “work around” it. 
Some might suggest that the device of an Implementing Agreement 
offers such a complicated, novel scheme that it would be simpler just to start 
the negotiations all over again, and draft a new and improved CTBT, one 
without the fatal disability of the Annex 2 unanimity requirement.  But 
“starting from scratch” is both unnecessary and unwise here.  We should not 
simply throw away the 166 ratifications that have been assembled so 
laboriously, nor should we dispose of all that has been accomplished by the 
two decades of salutary operation and hard lessons learned by the treaty’s 
Preparatory Commission and Provisional Technical Secretariat. 
The Implementing Agreement offers participating countries the option 
to proceed more nimbly to modify the article XIV defect; it permits them to 
build upon the accomplishments achieved to date, and dodge the burden of 
undertaking a second ratification effort.  Some states, of course, will not 
exercise that shortcut option—they would again follow the “standard” path 
of signature followed by ratification, pursuant to whatever national 
mechanism was required for authorizing each step.  But the Law of the Sea 
Convention precedent illustrates that at least some states will expedite the 
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process, bringing the revised package of international agreements into force 
more swiftly and easily. 
Not just incidentally, the Implementing Agreement also offers an 
advantage in confining the revision process to the single issue of article XIV, 
rather than risking re-opening the test ban treaty negotiations more generally.  
If the world were to create a more open-ended “second look” at the CTBT, 
who knows what other matters might be put onto the table?  The three years 
of formal CTBT negotiations (not to mention the four decades of background 
efforts that preceded them) were difficult and contentious; at many points, it 
was far from clear that success would be achieved.  Rather than revisiting all 
that trauma, the world should now focus on the one aspect of the original 
treaty that truly needs fixing: its cumbersome entry into force standards.188 
Another plausible alternative might be to strengthen the existing 
provisional status of the test ban and its supporting organizational 
infrastructure.189  For example, the CTBTO might be re-calibrated as a 
“permanent” international institution, shedding the words “preparatory” and 
“provisional” from its titles.  Likewise, the scope of the current provisional 
application could be expanded—just as the signatories had crafted the 
current range of partial implementation tasks, they could now agree to 
enlarge it, such as to operationalize the treaty’s on-site inspection apparatus 
and its dispute-resolution modalities.190  In some instances (the 1947 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is the most prominent illustration) 
 
 188.  Similar considerations arose during the process of revising the Law of the Sea Convention in 
1994, leading to a preference for an Implementing Agreement that would address only the single issue of 
revising Part XI, rather than risk re-opening the entire Convention for additional possible modification 
and unraveling.  See Anderson, supra note 132, at 277; see ANDERSON ESSAYS, supra note 125, at 277. 
 189.  In principle, the states that created the existing program of provisional operation could agree to 
enlarge its scope, edging closer to the equivalent of formal entry into force.  Alternatively, some subset 
of signatories could agree to go further inter se, even if others were reluctant.  See generally Michie, 
supra note 64; Dalton, supra note 65; D. Anderson, Legal Implications of the Entry into Force of the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 44 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 313 (1995); Lorand Bartels, Withdrawing 
Provisional Application of Treaties – Has the European Union Made a Mistake?, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 112–118 (2012). 
 190.   Frank Barnaby, Paul Rogers & Jack Mendelsohn, CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACHES TO LIMITING 
THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: SOME PROPOSALS FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION 13–15 (Apr. 2004), 
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/nonproliferation.pdf (proposing to expand the 
CTBT’s provisional application); Venturini, Prepcom at 20, supra note 65, at 350; Anthony Aust, et.al. 
A New Look at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), INT’L GROUP ON GLOB. SEC., 39–
41 (Sep. 2008), https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/External_Reports/ 
A_New_Look_at_the_Comprehensive_Nuclear-Test-Ban_Treaty.pdf; Des Browne, Verifying the 
Nuclear Test-Ban: A Regime That Works, supra note 78 (calling for designating the CTBT institutions as 
permanent bodies). 
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provisional application can run for decades, with approximately the level of 
support and accomplishment as an in-force treaty.191 
But that approach would still rest upon the concept of a provisional, 
temporary, and incomplete CTBT structure; it would not hasten the day of 
bringing the treaty fully into force.  What the world truly needs and wants is 
not enhanced provisional application, but a genuine, full-fledged CTBT, and 
the only currently viable route to that goal is via an Implementing 
Agreement.  There is an expressive value in the legal act of treaty-making, a 
worth in employing the formal trappings of international law and the hoary 
concept of pacta sunt servanda192 to underscore the world’s opposition to 
nuclear testing. 
In today’s U.S. political environment, it is difficult to be hopeful about 
domestic politics supporting ratification of the CTBT any time soon, or about 
the United States offering meaningful leadership in moving the world toward 
a legally-binding, permanent test ban regime.  But the rest of the world need 
not passively wait for political reformation in Washington, D.C.  Other 
power centers might decide to take feasible steps toward effectuation of the 
CTBT, even if the global process would not come to fruition for several more 
years.193 
The persistent blockage of CTBT is not fundamentally, and certainly 
not exclusively, an American problem.  It was not U.S. negotiators who took 
the lead in crafting article XIV, and even if the United States were to ratify 
the treaty soon, other recalcitrant states would continue to hold up full 
implementation.  Still, as a matter of political timing, the concept of an 
Implementing Agreement should be effectuated before the United States 
ratifies the CTBT.  If the sequence were reversed—if the Senate first 
provided its advice and consent to the current, unmodified CTBT, and the 
Implementing Agreement were developed subsequently—the United States 
would probably not be able to take advantage of the expedited procedures 
contemplated here.  That is, it would require bold presidential leadership, 
indeed, to dispense with a second vote of advice and consent.  While some 
other countries might be empowered, under their own constitutional 
structures, to effectuate the Implementing Agreement without laborious 
 
 191.  Bartels, supra note 189, at 112; Springer, Chapter 2, GATT 1994, available at 
file:///C:/Users/koplow/Downloads/9783642311420-c2.pdf. 
 192.  See VCLT, supra note 64, art. 26. 
 193.  See Ota, supra note 58 (reporting speculation that the United States might withdraw its 
signature from the CTBT). 
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domestic procedures, it seems likely that the U.S. Senate would insist upon 
having a second bite at the CTBT apple.194 
That timing poses another conundrum: the rest of the world might not 
be willing to undertake the heavy political lifting of crafting an 
Implementing Agreement of this sort unless the participating states were 
quite confident that U.S. ratification really was forthcoming.  Why undertake 
all these machinations if the indispensable nation might still stay on the 
sidelines?  On the other hand, a two-thirds Senate vote of advice and consent 
today would accomplish only part of the job—without the streamlining 
provided by the Implementing Agreement, even U.S. ratification would not 
effectuate the CTBT. 
Two scenarios might appear here.  In one, many of the CTBT 
signatories promptly pursue the Implementing Agreement as a route to 
legally effectuating the test ban, even while the United States (and perhaps 
other leading military powers) remain missing in action.  In the other, the 
United States is among those countries out in front pulling, despite some 
renegades (including some Annex 2 states) hanging back.  Domestic political 
circumstances will likely determine which scenario is more plausible; they 
may eventually get to the same outcome—but the progress would be faster 
and smoother in the latter case. 
The rest of the world sometimes does proceed with major arms control 
initiatives without the concurrence or even the participation of the United 
States (and of other prominent global security actors).  The 1997 Ottawa 
Convention on Anti-Personnel Land Mines195 and the 2008 Oslo Convention 
on Cluster Munitions196 were each crafted and promoted by like-minded 
states which urgently sought universal affiliation with the new regimes.  But 
those leaders were willing to proceed even without some of the world’s 
 
 194.  For comparison, the United States signed the LoSC Implementing Agreement subject to 
ratification in the ordinary way. In contrast, some states deliberately wanted to avoid having to return to 
their domestic authorities for a second ratification approval, and favored the simpler, easier, expedited 
process. Commentary—The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement 
on Implementation of Part XI, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 
WITH ANNEXES, AND THE AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PART XI OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, WITH ANNEX 76, 103D CONGRESS, 2D SESS., S. TREATY 
DOC. 103-39, (1994); Brown, supra note 134, at 7. 
 195.  Ottawa Convention, supra note 88.  The treaty has 162 parties, not including major land mine 
possessing countries China, India, Pakistan, Russia and the United States.  INT’L CAMPAIGN TO BAN 
LANDMINES—CLUSTER MUNITION COAL. (ICBL-CMC), LANDMINE MONITOR 2016 x, 1, 17 (Nov. 
2016), http://www.the-monitor.org/media/2386748/Landmine-Monitor-2016-web.pdf. 
 196.  Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dec. 3, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39, 
http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/01/Convention-ENG.pdf (entered into force Aug. 1, 2010).  
The treaty has 119 parties, not including major cluster munition possessing countries China, Russia, and 
the United States. ICBL-CMC, CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR 2016 viii, 1, 32 (Aug. 2016), 
http://www.the-monitor.org/media/2394895/Cluster-Munition-Monitor-2016-Web.pdf. 
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major military powers, such as the United States, Russia, and China, which 
have not signed either instrument.  The activists sought to align their own 
weapons postures with their own vision of security and humanity, even if 
doing so created persistently asymmetric legal obligations.197 
Most pointedly, in 2016, the United Nations authorized the initiation of 
negotiations on a treaty to abolish all nuclear weapons—even though the five 
permanent members of the Security Council unanimously disparaged the 
effort and vowed not to participate.198  In short order, a Ban Treaty was 
concluded, with 122 states endorsing the text, despite the absence of all the 
countries acknowledged to possess nuclear weapons.  The overwhelming 
majority of states were so committed to the goal of “getting to zero” nuclear 
weapons that they plunged ahead to sign the treaty themselves, even while 
other critically important players continued to resist.199  Perhaps a similar 
sentiment could energize momentum toward a CTBT Implementing 
Agreement even if some of the key forty-four states remain aloof.200 
 
 197.  LANDMINE MONITOR, supra note 195, at 7–17; CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, supra note 196, 
at 7–12. 
 198.  U.N. Gen. Assembly, First Comm. on Disarmament & Int’l Sec., Taking Forward Multilateral 
Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations, U.N. Doc A/C.1/71/L.41 (Oct. 27, 2016); G.A. Res. 71/258 (Dec. 
23, 2016); Kingston Reif, UN Approves Start of Nuclear Ban Talks,  ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Nov. 2016, 
at 25 (reporting a vote of 123-38, with 16 abstentions, in favor of prompt initiation of negotiations, despite 
vigorous lobbying against the resolution by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States); Paul Meyer, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Fin de Regime?, 47 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 
No. 3, (Apr. 16, 2017); Robert Wood, U.S. Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, 
Remarks at U.N. General Assembly First Committee Thematic Discussion on Nuclear Weapons (Oct. 18, 
2016) https://geneva.usmission.gov/2016/10/18/ambassador-wood-remarks-at-u-n-general-assembly-
first-committee-thematic-discussion-on-nuclear-weapons/  (expressing official U.S. opposition to the 
resolution); Proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), NUCLEAR THREAT INST. (Oct. 31, 2016), 
http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-nuclear-weapons-convention-nwc/. 
 199. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, [signed September 20, 2017], available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2017/07/20170707%2003-42%20PM/Ch_XXVI_9.pdf; Matthew 
Bolton, A Brief Guide to the New Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty, Just Security, July 14, 2017, available 
at https://www.justsecurity.org/43004/guide-nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty/; John Burroughs, Key Issues 
in Negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty, 47 ARMS CONTROL TODAY No. 5, 6 (June 
2017) available at https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-06/features/key-issues-negotiations-nuclear-
weapons-prohibition-treaty; Briefing on Nuclear Ban Treaty by NSC Senior Director Christopher Ford, 
Carnegie Endowment, August 22, 2017, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/08/22/briefing-
on-nuclear-ban-treaty-by-nsc-senior-director-christopher-ford-event-
5675?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWXpZeU9UUXlOV1F5TnpCaiIsInQiOiJXWXVnVjRxUTZHRHJ3RCtKWGk
2dHZLbnpvcFRJaW54TkFmUUlxUFZFSENaRWlLSTU3b1ZiZVlaYW1LMkpZZkhqN3ZGNzd0N3
M0RExDaGFMeUdHOEpZdWErWFN0b3VlNkRXbTl6MGlTZCtadVJnMVwvNkNTdVFTZDMyVn
M0UWV0c1IifQ%3D%3D. 
 200.  It may be debatable how valuable an arms control agreement can be, if the key players (the 
states that most possess and use the weapon in question) remain outside the regime. Observers would 
differ, for example, regarding the direct strategic or tactical significance of the Ottawa and Oslo 
agreements. For the CTBT Implementing Agreement to have more than symbolic value, it would have to 
sooner or later attract the participation of the leading nuclear weapons possessing states. 
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The process of developing, propagating, and securing international 
assent to the concept of a CTBT Implementing Agreement would doubtless 
take some time (although the 1994 experience with the comparable Law of 
the Sea Convention bargaining demonstrates that the mechanism can be 
expedited dramatically, if the international political stars align).  Even if the 
Trump Administration proves to be no friend of the CTBT, four years could 
be put to good purpose by advancing the ultimate entry into force of the 
treaty through disposing of the artificial impediment of article XIV.  
International experience has amply demonstrated that even very important 
treaties can function for sustained periods without the participation of 
seemingly crucial states, such as the LoSC (lacking the United States), the 
LTBT (without France and China), and the NPT (absent India, Israel, North 
Korea, and Pakistan).201 
Most importantly, the proposal here will succeed in returning the CTBT 
into the realm of “normal” international treaty politics.  Instead of handing 
to the most recalcitrant states an immovable veto over the national security 
policies of all other countries, the Implementing Agreement creates room for 
more traditional, and perhaps more effective, diplomacy.  Certainly, the 
entire world will continue to be very interested in bringing India, Iran, North 
Korea, Pakistan, and other outliers into the CTBT fold—the calculations that 
animated the original article XIV have not dissipated.  But instead of relying 
exclusively upon the tactic of a rigid unanimity requirement, the modified 
CTBT could be more capacious, opening multiple, more flexible avenues of 
persuasion and politics. 
That is, after all, the way the grand game of international security policy 
has been played for decades.  The NPT and the LTBT, to cite just two 
conspicuous illustrations, have flourished even while failing to achieve 
100% universality.  There are two unarguable propositions here: the world 
would be better off if the NPT (and the LTBT) were joined by all states, 
instead of by nearly all; and the world is better off for having the NPT (and 
the LTBT) in force, rather than allowing them to linger indefinitely on the 
doorstep of legal operation, pending the endorsement by the last holdout 
state. 
The chess match of international politics in treaty adherence can be 
quite complex and uncertain.  Perhaps the dynamic will spin in a negative 
 
 201.  This point reveals another partial contrast between the LoSC precedent and the CTBT 
Implementing Agreement. In the LoSC case, the purpose of the exercise was to facilitate the process of 
bringing into the regime the United States and other key developed countries, because the contemplated 
regime could not be effective without their participation. In the CTBT case, the objective is to allow a 
coalition of the willing to proceed without some of the states (potentially including the United States) that 
had previously been identified as essential. 
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direction, with state A declining to join until state B joins, and B insisting 
upon waiting for state C, and so forth.  Sometimes, however, the flow can be 
positive, with A and B together pressuring C, or D and E agreeing to make a 
“package deal” with F, where the value of one state accepting the treaty is 
amplified by its cascading effect on others. 
As John R. Redick has argued in the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 
there is real value in a multilateral standard-setting agreement, even if it lacks 
the participation by certain “core” countries for years or decades.202  He notes 
that the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone “existed for twenty-five 
years without the full participation of several nations [Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, and Cuba] which, by any calculation (size, GNP, population, nuclear 
development) are key regional nations.”203 Yet, the treaty helped define the 
regional norm of nuclear weapons prohibition, promoted the view that non-
participating states were acting at variance with the common will of their 
neighbors, and led, over time, to universal acceptance of the goals. 
As a domestic matter within the United States, it is possible that the 
Senate, in considering the CTBT and Implementing Agreement, could 
condition its advice and consent upon an insistence that the president not 
deposit the instrument of ratification (thereby bringing the treaty into force 
for the United States) until country X or Y (or X and Y) did likewise.  That 
gamesmanship might handicap (or, conversely, might further empower) the 
executive branch in undertaking the subsequent bargaining with X and Y.  
But at least the conditions would be written into the internal rules of the 
United States, subject to subsequent reevaluation and revision, as the 
domestic and international politics continue to writhe, rather than being cast 
into the un-amendable stone of the treaty text.  The United States will surely 
want North Korea to join the CTBT, but experience has revealed the folly of 
ceding to Pyongyang an absolute veto over the treaty’s entry into force for 
the United States and other like-minded countries.204 
In this sense, a major treaty, as Edward Corwin famously observed 
about the U.S. Constitution, is “an ‘invitation to struggle’” over foreign 
 
 202.  John R. Redick, Precedents and Legacies: Tlatelolco’s Contribution to the 21st Century, in 
NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, U.N. INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, 
UNIDIR 97/37 39, 41–42 (Pericles G. Alves & Daiana B. Cipollone eds., 1997). 
 203.  Id. at 41. 
 204.  It must be conceded that this proposal does, unfortunately, relax some of the erstwhile political 
pressure upon the outlier Annex 2 states; activists could no longer argue to them that their participation 
is essential and that they are responsible for blocking the world’s interest in implementing the CTBT.  On 
the other hand, that pressure has proven unavailing for two decades, and it would now be useful to reduce 
the “price” that an Annex 2 state could demand in return for joining. 
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policy.205  There can be no guarantee that this ceaseless struggle will lead to 
results that are wise, successful, or timely, but the current article XIV 
prevents states from approaching the enterprise with the full panoply of 
political strategies and inducements. 
Even entry into force does not terminate that struggle.  If the CTBT 
were to prove imperfect in operation, it would then be subject to the 
operation of its “normal” amendment procedures.  Additionally, if the 
straightjacket of a non-testing regime proved too tight, a state could exercise 
the “supreme interests withdrawal” clause206 and exit.  But again, the 
unorthodox route of an Implementing Agreement at least succeeds in 
opening up that realm of possible state practice, negotiation and 
experience—it re-introduces an array of national security policy tools that is 
currently foreclosed. 
A final cautionary note: there is plenty of adverse precedent here, and 
many routes by which a treaty can fail.  Some important arms control treaties 
never enter into force, despite seemingly widespread support.207  Some 
treaties do achieve operational status, but years or decades elapse before the 
United States joins.208  And some treaties do take effect, but never enjoy the 
participation of crucial states, dooming them to failure.209  Even with the 
most creative thinking and persistent efforts, the CTBT may add to those sad 
sagas. 
The Law of the Sea Convention experience with an Implementing 
Agreement is instructive, if far from perfect.  After all, even with the stark 
re-drafting of the original Part XI—as the world acceded to the U.S. interest 
in thoroughly revising the international rules for mining of the deep sea 
bed—the United States has still not joined the treaty.  LoSC therefore 
 
 205.  Raffaella Baritono, An Invitation to Struggle? Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy, ISPI Analysis 
No. 229, (Jan. 2014), http://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/analysis_229_2013.pdf. 
 206.  CTBT, supra note 1, art. IX.2 (providing that each party, in the exercise of its national 
sovereignty, has “the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to 
the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests”). 
 207.   Ban Ki-Moon, U.N. Secretary Gen., Secretary-General’s Remarks at the Eighth Conference 
on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Sep. 27, 2013), 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2013-09-27/secretary-generals-remarks-eighth-
conference-facilitating-entry (citing examples of the 1919 Convention for the Control of the Trade in 
Arms and Ammunition and the 1925 Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms 
and Ammunition and in Implements of War, which never entered into force). 
 208.   Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and 
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol), June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571 (entered into 
force Feb. 8, 1928) (prohibiting chemical and biological warfare, but the United States did not join until 
Apr. 10, 1975); see GRAHAM & LAVERA, supra note 12, at 7–10. 
 209.   Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of 
Versailles), at 119, June 28, 1919, 1 L.N.T.S. 403, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-
ust000002-0043.pdf (United States not a party). 
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provides only a limited “success story” in the process of treaty 
modification—it is the treaty lawyer’s version of the sad medical conclusion 
that “the operation was a success, but the patient died.”  The world will surely 
hesitate before once again moving a mountain to accommodate U.S. interests 
and demands, without adequate assurance that reciprocal performance will 
be forthcoming.  But the LoSC case study at least validates the legal and 
practical availability of this contrivance. 
An Implementing Agreement is, at best, a cumbersome and ungainly 
option.  The world should not pursue it, if there were other, more feasible 
routes to effectuation of the CTBT.  But in the absence of ratification by all 
forty-four Annex 2 states, and in view of the critical importance of 
effectuating this long-sought prize in arms control, perhaps we can best 
extricate ourselves from the current stasis by adopting a slight modification 
of the famous Sherlock Holmes solution to a persistent riddle: When all other 
alternatives have been eliminated as [politically] impossible, whatever 
remains, however improbable, must be the truth.210 
 
 
 210. This aphorism appears in slightly different form in several Arthur Conan Doyle works, perhaps 
most famously in THE SIGN OF THE FOUR (1890), ch. 6. 
